Making a Virtue of Necessity:  
Herman Miller’s Model for Innovation

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The center piece of the October 2011 issue of Fast Company was an article titled “The United States of Design,” which celebrated the influence of American designers and design-centered companies. The article singled out ten design icons in corporate America, including Herman Miller, Inc., which appeared beside Apple Inc.1 Herman Miller has earned a global reputation as a paragon of creativity, with multiple designs earning design of the decade and with the molded plywood chair recognized by Time magazine as design of the 20th century. Such innovation has been an integral factor in the company’s position as an industry leader (named “most admired” furniture company 16 of the first 18 years after joining the Fortune 500 in 1986). Based on recent scholarship in regional studies, however, one would never have guessed that a company from Zeeland, Michigan, distant from creative enclaves such as New York and Los Angeles, would make such an impact.

How does a company so reliant on creativity in design thrive outside of the orbit of the creative class? Based on the company’s archival material (internal and external reports, papers and correspondence of executives and designers, meeting minutes, and annual reports), I will show how the furniture industry predicament and practices and the company’s location provided key constraints under which Herman Miller operated. The company’s location helped dictate a distinctive business model, with no designers on

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staff and where none of the designers doing work for Herman Miller had exclusive agreements. The result was surrender of a substantial portion of the firm’s strategic direction to outsiders, who in turn identified with the firm. Herman Miller established this model during the mid-twentieth century high tide of vertical integration in America. Decades later, the company would be better positioned than many other firms when the information revolution, among other factors, helped encourage the disintegration of the monolithic corporate model. The company’s adaptation to its distance from preferred locations for the creative class positioned the firm to initiate and benefit from disruptive innovation rather than be victimized by it.

**Change Without Innovation**

American corporate folklore tends to fall into one of two types of plotlines: either an immaculate conception (born perfect and then the extended shadow of the founder) or a “road to Damascus” moment where a benighted leader has a transformative experience, after which the company is never the same. There was nothing immaculate about the conception of Herman Miller. In 1905, the Star Furniture Company was established as a manufacturer of traditional furniture, for department stores such as Sears Roebuck and Marshall Field.\(^2\) The key individual in the history of the firm would be D. J. De Pree, who began performing office duties for the company after graduating from high school in 1909. De Pree had served as general manager for four years in 1923 when his father-in-law (Herman Miller) acquired a controlling interest in the firm, and De Pree renamed the firm in his honor.

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The industry in which De Pree operated was characterized by perpetual change but scant innovation. An influential American buyer said: “You could blow up 2,900 of 3,000 furniture plants and not damage the industry as far as constructive thinking and activity are concerned.” Innovation required capital, however, and the scale of the industry was small. Small size bred inefficiencies, part of a vicious cycle that prevented the accumulation of capital. Between 1899 and 1927 horse power per wage-earner in the US furniture industry increased 79 percent compared with a figure of 117 percent for all manufacturing industry in America.” Particularly striking were contrasts within the state of Michigan, where the auto industry embraced increased productivity and the assembly line early in the twentieth century, allowing the industry to generate capital. By contrast, as late as 1941, there were would be only six firms in the furniture industry (Herman Miller not among them) with revenues of more than $5 million.

In the 1920s, Grand Rapids, a cradle of factory furniture production, was in the midst of a transformation similar to the one undergone by the Japanese automobile industry during the 1970s and 1980s, from a reputation of poor quality to a quality leader. The area had originally become a furniture making center because of its proximity to raw materials. The local timber played itself out, and attracted by a more plentiful supply as well as cheaper labor, three of the area’s largest producers moved south. Herman Miller did not. A Herman Miller internal memorandum noted: “The skilled craftsmanship and high price of the labor in our area almost made it necessary to continue in the quality

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field and especially because as a company we had quality ideals.” Once driven by proximity to natural resources, the region’s furniture makers became more associated with skilled labor. A commitment to the high end of the market and to continuous innovation rather than relying on cost cutting meant an improvement in the reputation of furniture from the Grand Rapids area.

Prior to 1930, Herman Miller may have strived for quality, but not originality. D. J. De Pree later recalled, “There was constant guessing by the leading [department store] buyers as to whether the popular thing the next season would be Louis XVI, or Queen Anne, or Hepplewhite, or Sheraton, or Adam. This was followed by a scramble on the part of most manufacturers to follow the leaders.” In the 1920s, DePree contracted with the company’s first designer, the Grand Rapids-based Edgar Somes. The expectations of designers doing reproductions of period furniture were much different than they would later become for those creating modern furniture. Somes and his successor, Aurelio Bevelaqua, “‘designed’ in the customary Grand Rapids manner, which in the words of Herman Miller salesman Eugene Eppinger, was “seeing who could make the worst copies of famous old designs every six months.”

During the 1920s, Herman Miller and its peers were in reaction mode. According to De Pree, manufacturers were “mere fabricators with very little control of what they wanted to make and no control of the sale of their product.” The company compensated

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7 Hugh De Pree, Business as Unusual: The People and Principles at Herman Miller (Herman Miller, 1986): 13


with a command-and-control style of leadership, an approach for which the Ford Motor Company, on the opposite side of Michigan, was known. Henry Ford once said, “Why is it every time I ask for a pair of hands, they come with a brain attached?” Similarly, in a small company primarily populated with production workers, De Pree did not pay much attention to the interests, knowledge, or desires of his workforce. That would change—and with dramatic effect on the company’s culture and business model.

De Pree had an epiphany in 1927, when one of his employees died suddenly. When De Pree visited the man’s widow, she read him some poetry her husband had written. For De Pree, who viewed his employees as hired hands, this was a road to Damascus moment. Had this man been a millwright who wrote poetry? Or a poet who made ends meet as a millwright? 

DePree resolved to establish an environment at the company in which each person should feel comfortable bringing his/her full self to the task. This belief ran against the orthodoxy of the time, based on the principles of scientific management, in which one group thought and planned, and another carried out those wishes. Herman Miller developed the practice of “roving leadership,” where the person with the experience and knowledge (regardless of position in the hierarchy—or even outside the firm) will step up and engage a problem. Such a “scouting” model is based on the philosophy that fruitful

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10 Henry Ford, My Life and Work.

11 For the millwright story, see M. De Pree, Leadership is an Art (New York, 1989): 5-8.

ideas can come from any level of the organization, and even from beyond its walls. When such a model works, the strength of the idea will prevail regardless of its source.

There was, however, one major problem with a model that involved a search for the best idea. Sleepy Zeeland, Michigan was not Mecca to the creative class; designers, artists, and architects prefer more cosmopolitan places. Partly because of the company’s location, the odds of designers joining the staff were remote. Staying in western Michigan would mean one thing to Herman Miller: arms-length relations with more sophisticated designers. Little wonder that in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the company’s directors of design were from New York, and that the company’s most prominent designer would be from Los Angeles. This is where D. J. DePree’s openness to new ideas, regardless of source, shaped the future of the company. Perhaps De Pree’s greatest contribution to the firm was, as Ralph Caplan suggested, his comfort in the position of being “influenced.” Such receptivity also aligned with the religious beliefs of De Pree, who saw the hand of God in the work of creative types: “The great Creator-Designer must be the ‘giver’ of creativity.”13 Key designers, neither on the payroll nor with exclusive agreements, would wield influence, in matters ranging from design to corporate strategy, at the same time they embraced a sense of identification with the firm.14

13 “Lesson no. 5—Sec. II,” August 6, 1963.
14 Caplan, The Design of Herman Miller: 16.
The New Modern

In 1931, The New Survey of London Life and Labor proclaimed: “The demand for period furniture shows signs of giving place to a craving for ultramodern forms of severe and simple types, which wholly ignore tradition and claim the fulfillment of function as their only object.”15 The previous summer, Gilbert Rohde, one of the leaders in bringing European-style avant-garde design to the United States, strode into Herman Miller’s Grand Rapids showroom. Herman Miller—a company of a couple dozen production workers—was, as D.J. De Pree acknowledged, “pretty far down on his list.”16 Unfortunately for Rohde, receptiveness in America for the modern style had not approached that in Europe. A 1929 survey of 4,000 American furniture dealers found that only 10 percent of their sales had been “art moderne.”17 Rohde had found few takers for his ideas; in 1930, he had only lined up one manufacturer: Heywood Wakefield.18

D. J. De Pree would later call Rohde’s arrival in Herman Miller’s showroom “providential” for the company, but the company did not immediately seize the moment with Rohde in 1930. Years before, Herman Miller had produced a modern suite, which had since disappeared from the company’s offerings. The aesthetics of Rohde’s pieces did not at first appeal to DePree, and then De Pree had to overcome the objections of his father-in-law and the company’s board of directors.19 The company’s predicament helped win them over. After a five year industry-wide slump, the following year Herman Miller

15 Edwards, Twentieth-Century Furniture: 123.

16 Caplan: 24.


18 Ross, Gilbert Rohde: 40.

19 Ross, Gilbert Rohde: 236.
was one or two more bad years from insolvency, and without a solution in sight. A Herman Miller vice president later summed up De Pree’s receptiveness to Rohde: “It’s the guy who’s sickest that recognizes the healer.”

Rohde, like his successors as Herman Miller design director, was a broad-gauged thinker who helped bring some of the world’s latest thought to the company (a role that designers play for Herman Miller to this day). Like his successors, Rohde’s specialty was not furniture. Before the existence of professional training programs in industrial design, the field attracted individuals with backgrounds such as theater design and advertising. Rohde had gathered experience far afield, in drama and music criticism and political cartoons, but also in advertising illustration, retail merchandising, and technical and engineering training. Rohde established an office in New York City in 1929, and would design for companies in the electrical, automotive, chemical, and furniture industries.

The modern style of design for the home was simple, functional, and did not draw attention to the furniture. Rohde and his peers believed that the most important thing in the room should be the people. Ornate furniture as conversation piece had no place in that world. Part of Rohde’s appeal for DePree was philosophical; he liked the “honesty” of Rohde’s approach, which contrasted with the traditional practices of using the ornate to hide production flaws. Rohde also represented a source of new ideas, what Gary Smith,

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20 Herman Miller 1931 financial statements.
21 Caplan: 19.
22 Don Goeman interview with the author, 8/11/11.
23 Ross, Gilbert Rohde: 37.
Herman Miller’s Director of Design Facilitation, calls a “provocateur.” Having such individuals can, says Gary Miller, who headed R&D for the company, “set [the company] on a new course.” That is precisely what happened with Gilbert Rohde and Herman Miller.

Yet what sort of arrangement could the company and designer agree upon? De Pree’s cash starved firm had no budget for another employee. When Rohde asked for a $1,000 fee for his designs (three times what the company paid its Grand Rapids designers), De Pree demurred, opting instead for a royalty-based arrangement that protected the company’s short-term cash flow. Even after the company returned to financial health, the royalty-based arrangements with designers stuck. One advantage to Herman Miller of such an arrangement is that it allowed the company to take a chance on new and relatively unproven designers. If things did not work out, then there was not the same difficulty an organization might confront with respect to a member of the staff who turned out to be a poor match for the company. This provisional arrangement was attractive to a designer who might not want to commit to only one company. That was the case with Rohde, a freelancer at heart who did work for a variety of agencies, furniture manufacturers and companies in other industries, but never as a member of an organization’s staff.

Rohde brought more than design skill to Herman Miller. He brought knowledge of selling, advertising, and merchandising that would prove invaluable. Working with De

25 Gary Smith interview with the author, 5/24/11.
26 Gary Miller interview with the author, 6/2/11.
28 Interview of Mrs. Rohde, 8/18/83.
Pree and Jimmy Eppinger, the company’s east coast sales manager, Rohde helped transforms the company’s advertising, catalogues, and sales literature—as well as its showroom. He successfully argued for moving the company’s primary Midwest showroom from Grand Rapids to Chicago. He also acted as an educator. During Eppinger’s first seven years with Herman Miller (1934-41), he received a first-rate education on modern design—his “office” was a desk in Rohde’s New York design studio. Another “student” in that office was D. J. De Pree’s son, and successor as CEO. Hugh De Pree had just graduated from Hope College and spent the summer of 1938 working half time for Eppinger and half time for Rohde.

Even as he expanded his practice, Rohde took more than a transactional interest in Herman Miller. He was sufficiently engaged in the firm’s prospects that he never hesitated to speak his mind on a variety of matters with his client, including overall strategy and product line. By January of 1935, Rohde was pushing the benefits to Herman Miller of “concentrating more on modern, even if you mean by that dropping everything else.” D. J. initially resisted, arguing that “it still brings us a reasonable volume.” Although the shift did not happen as soon as Rohde wanted, by January 1941 the transition was complete.

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32 Rohde to D. J. De Pree, 1/26/35.

33 De Pree to Rohde, 1/28/35.

34 Eugene Eppinger oral history, August 1988: 2.
In some ways, the pairing of D. J. De Pree and Gilbert Rohde (as well as with Rohde’s successor, George Nelson) seemed an odd one. De Pree’s religious belief was ever present. In the late 1920s, he established a Baptist church in Zeeland (De Pree had rebelled from the Dutch Reformed Church, which was dominant in the local area). Yet he managed to develop relationships with designers, who tended not to be religious. He viewed their creative gifts as the hand of God at work, and they appreciated how he deferred to them, as opposed to many industries (such as automobiles) in which designers contributed only after engineers had completed their work on the project.

De Pree’s faith was complemented, however, by an acute sense of situational reality. That reality often derived from information and advice his designers provided. In 1943, when the federal government prohibited furniture manufacturers from introducing new models. This was a big blow to Rohde, who had developed a reputation as a furniture specialist. De Pree asked Rohde to prepare reports on how to improve the business. Rohde provided DePree a heavy dose of reality regarding manufacturing. He warned DePree that “in order to survive the post-war period The Herman Miller Furniture Company must make certain improvements in mechanical equipment and manufacturing, stocking, and filling orders.” Rohde noted “you have not been in the forefront in mechanized equipment or application of advanced technologies for the last ten years.” Rohde contrasted Herman Miller’s progress with that of “Southern plants, making furniture that you undoubtedly feel is very inferior to yours.” While Rohde acknowledged

35 Rohde to D. J. De Pree, 2/23/44.

that it was “remarkable what good work you have done with the old-fashioned methods, the sad fact is no one rewards you for the achievement in overcoming handicaps.”

During the war, manufacturing (including furniture industry plants) had shifted away from custom to mass production in order to meet emergency needs. Having moved in that direction, many manufacturers stayed with the more efficient methods. Rohde believed that those who did not mechanize would be left behind: “Hundreds of factories of your size will give up.” The solution was increased capital expenditure at the level that the company’s coffers could not support. “Tell your stockholders to forget about dividends,” Rohde warned. “They have to fork up or they might as well kiss their stocks good-bye.”

This is the sort of advice that an individual might hesitate to offer from within the corporate hierarchy, for fear of losing his or her job. Yet as an outsider, Rohde was able to play the role of provocateur. Rohde also went beyond the consultant’s role as advisor, and acted more like a general contractor. In his discussion of how DePree could mechanize the production process, Rohde offered to “do everything I can to take the detail of this out of your hands after the decisions are made. . . I have had experience with this sort of thing.” Rohde advised not only on setting up machinery in plastics, metal, resin plywood, and bent laminated wood. In addition, he advised on personnel issues, such as the sort of individuals to seek, as well as how to properly train them.

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37 Rohde to D. J. De Pree, 9/8/43.
38 Rohde to D. J. De Pree, 9/8/43.
39 Rohde to D. J. De Pree, 12/27/43.
Within six months of providing that advice, in June of 1944, Rohde was dead of a sudden heart attack. How could the company replace its principal designer, especially if there were no internal department from which to promote? The company had a two-man search committee (D. J. DePree and Jimmy Eppinger) for a new head of design for the company. D. J. later recalled, “You have no idea how many telegrams we got before poor old Gilbert Rohde was cold in his grave, from people who were going to lead us into the promised land.” De Pree did not jump at any of those experienced furniture designers, however, because “their furniture was awful.” Fortunately for Herman Miller, one of Rohde’s legacies was designs with a commercial life of 5-10 years as opposed to 1-3 years for those of his predecessors. Therefore, the company did not have an undue sense of urgency in finding a replacement. The search would last for more than a year.

The search ended with George Nelson, who like Rohde had little experience with furniture. A Yale-trained architect, Nelson was, as Olga Gueft noted, part of “the ‘lost generation’ of architects who emerged from academia at a rather inauspicious time—when building was frozen, first by the Great Depression and, several years later, by World War II.” The profession’s imbalance between supply and demand provided an opportunity for Herman Miller.

George Nelson had become a journalist with Time/Life in the 1930s and was teaching at Columbia. Indeed, it was an article Nelson wrote for Architectural Forum that brought him to the attention of D. J. DePree in late 1944. D. J.’s first impression was:


“Here is a brilliant thinker . . . ahead of the parade.”[^42] Although designing furniture had never been his primary task, Nelson had designed furniture as part of the homes he had worked on.[^43] Therefore, as with Gilbert Rohde, the company took a chance on Nelson rather than select a more experienced furniture man. Nelson recalled later that, “having checked all the experts and not liking what they did, they thought they could hardly lose casting their lot with an amateur.”[^44]

**Outsider as Insider**

With the 1927 completion of the River Rouge plant, the Ford Motor Company attained the quintessence of vertical integration, that is, bringing as much of the supply chain as possible under one roof. The result was a triumph of planning and control. On the other side of Michigan from Detroit, the furniture industry operated differently. Rather than race toward vertical integration, the furniture industry appeared to drag its feet.

In Zeeland, Herman Miller’s barriers to vertical integration included scale, sophistication, and liquidity. At first, the company had no cash with which to pay designers. Necessity became a virtue. Joe Schwartz, who headed sales at Herman Miller, once said that “vertical integration is the eventual enemy of design innovation.”[^45] The company recognized that if brought into the firm, the designers might be overly restricted

[^42]: D. J. De Pree memo 11/29/44.

[^43]: De Pree to J. Eppinger, 12/5/44.

[^44]: Nelson interview, 1/29/68: 8

by the operations side. George Nelson said, “There are two kinds of designers: company designers who do what they are told and designers who assemble information which trigger ideas, not necessarily on the same subject, but the result is an idea or design in a related field. . .” In Detroit, auto designers followed orders. By contrast, from the late 1930s until the 1960s, the executives at Herman Miller were comfortable with a model in which they said, “you’re the designer and whatever you do I’m going to accept.”

As with Rohde, the nature of the agreement with Nelson meant that neither party was taking too big a risk. The contract letter appeared to limit Nelson: “Beginning August 1st 1945, you and we are entering into an arrangement whereby you design household and office furniture exclusively for us, all such designs to become our property. . .” Yet the exclusivity had to do with an area in which Nelson had done little work. Nelson would later clarify his understanding of the contract: “I believe the ‘exclusive’ provision in the original contract is clearly understood by both of us. You do not wish me to work for any other company in the furniture field for reasons we both understand and with which I am inclined to sympathize. It is also understood that this does not preclude the possibility of working in furniture which would be entirely non-competitive. . . In no case, however, would I make any arrangements without your full understanding and free consent.”

Beyond furniture, there were no limitations on Nelson—as an architect, or as a journalist. He would remain an editor for Architectural Forum until 1949. Nelson also

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46 Gary Miller interview with the author, 6/2/11.
47 Interview of Bob Blaich, Hugh De Pree, and Max De Pree, 12/13/74.
48 De Pree to Nelson, 7/30/45.
49 Nelson to De Pree, 3/28/47.
kept his office with Time/Life, and would use the letterhead of *Fortune* magazine until he
opened his own design office in 1947. The letterhead was no mere window dressing;
Nelson maintained his relationship with *Fortune* because his monthly advance on
royalties from Herman Miller was not enough to live on.\(^{50}\) Therefore, Nelson spent much
of 1946 visiting 15-20 companies, investigating practices in the industry for an article
that he proposed publishing in *Fortune*.\(^{51}\) Nelson recalled that assignment, rather than
distracting him from his new relationship with Herman Miller, enhanced it: “I also had a
selfish interest in this because this was a very good way to get inside a lot of furniture
factories and find out a little more about this industry.”\(^{52}\) He would learn that it made
little sense for Herman Miller to follow a similar path as other high-profile industries
*Fortune* followed, such as the automotive industry.

George Nelson took a broad view of his role with respect to Herman Miller. Like
Gilbert Rohde, Nelson offered advice that went beyond the scope of design. Like Rohde,
Nelson acted as general contractor on behalf of the company. For Nelson, this role came
early in his tenure as Design Director. During his first few months working with the
company, Nelson did what today’s engineers do: investigated into new materials.\(^{53}\) One
of the indirect results of World War II was a preponderance of new materials available
for peacetime use. Nelson approached Fairchild Aircraft regarding materials for bonding
material to wood.\(^{54}\) He met with representatives of American Cyanamid regarding

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\(^{50}\) Nelson interview 1/29/68, p. 8.


\(^{52}\) Nelson interview 1/29/68: 9.

\(^{53}\) Don Goeman interview with the author, 8/11/11.

\(^{54}\) Hamby to Nelson, 9/21/45.
Formica-type materials\textsuperscript{55}, and with “makers of formal plywood, aluminum, and impregnated glass fabrics.”\textsuperscript{56}

Max DePree, son of D. J. De Pree and one of his successors as CEO, once said that “participative ownership offers Herman Miller a competitive edge.” Specifically, he meant that ownership was not limited to a few: “Everyone receiving a fair return for the investment of his or her time and talents in helping solve the problems the business faces. . . It is getting a reward because one has risked involvement in the business. At Herman Miller, equity is not limited to employees but embraces other stockholders, customers, dealers, and suppliers as well.”\textsuperscript{57} Many individuals identified with the company’s success whether or not they were on the payroll or owned any shares. Such identification was evident with the company’s designers, particularly George Nelson. Although not on the payroll, he identified with the company. As early as the summer of 1945, Nelson wrote, “As a member of the organization, I have an interest in helping frame those policies which would most effectively increase the company’s prosperity.”\textsuperscript{58}

Nelson offered key advice to top management regarding the general direction of the company. His knowledge of the industry allowed him to not only discuss what the competition was doing, but to anticipate future sources of competition. In 1949, he wrote D. J.: “The rate at which modern furniture is being accepted by the buying public means only one thing: more and more companies will be switching their design programs. This, in turn, means that the unique position Herman Miller enjoys at the present time will not

\textsuperscript{55} Nelson to D. J. De Pree, 12/24/45.

\textsuperscript{56} Nelson to De Pree, 10/5/45.

\textsuperscript{57} Max De Pree quoted, 3/11/99.

\textsuperscript{58} Nelson to De Pree “Summer 1945”
continue to exist; at least not to the same degree.” His 1946 survey of furniture industry manufacturing had found a major disadvantage that Herman Miller faced: “As the bigger companies with their more efficient productive setups move in what has been our exclusive territory, we will face more and more competition.” The solution? “One method by which we will handle this competition, of course, is to continue to produce designs well in advance of the other manufacturers. . .”59 This meant that the company’s longstanding commitment to high quality product would have to be accompanied by fundamental innovation.

At midcentury, Herman Miller was strictly a manufacturer, and Nelson did not hesitate to speak up when the company’s offerings were not meeting expectations. In 1947, he wrote D. J.: “The problem that now comes up again is a matter of production, which ties in with deliveries, which in turn, relate themselves to good-will. Sylvia Shenbaum of Bloomingdale’s called the other day and remarked, among other things, that she did not have much confidence in the company’s ability to deliver merchandise when it said it would . . . this kind of feeling must not be allowed to exist because ultimately it will hurt us . . . the day is not far off when Bloomingdale’s and stores like it will be most important to us, and the only time to cement relationships is now.”60

Nelson also weighed in on matters related to advertising and promotion. His advice could be restrained, as it was in his September 1946 memo to D. J. De Pree about the company’s presence in magazines: “I think we will relax at this end and try to get our

59 Nelson to De Pree, 12/6/49.
60 Nelson to D. J. De Pree, 2/26/47.
publicity when we have something to publicize.” Nelson’s role regarding advertising was greeted, not resisted.” As to announcements and advertising,” wrote D. J., “I surely would like to have you do everything that you are able to do at your end.” In 1947, Nelson dug in regarding, of all things, the choice of a photographer. D. J.’s preference was for a Grand Rapids-based photographer, and Nelson argued in favor of one from New York. Nelson saw that choice as not trivial, but rather as an indicator of the company’s strategy, reputation, and integrity: “We make a line of furniture which is high in price and is equally high in quality. Everything the company does, therefore, in its relation with possible buyers, has to conform with this situation.” Then he proceeded to the question at hand: “our catalog, for instance, simply cannot be the haphazard collection of bad photographs, badly printed, that we have in the catalog, nor can the photographs themselves be of ordinary commercial quality because the furniture is not of ordinary commercial quality.” Even when upset, Nelson’s use of “we” and “our” showed De Pree the extent of his identification with the firm.

Nelson could really turn the knife, too: “If Herman Miller’s existence is based on the assumption that it can find enough buyers for our expensive and high quality products it cannot then turn around and use the methods appropriate only for a borax manufacturer when it promotes that product.” D. J. De Pree may have been taken aback, and even slightly offended by Nelson’s rants, but had the big picture understanding that such

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61 Nelson to D. J. De Pree, 9/6/46.
62 De Pree to Nelson, 10/3/46.
63 Nelson to De Pree, 2/26/47.
64 Nelson to De Pree, 2/26/47.
external viewpoints, even expressed in such over-the-top fashion, could enhance the company’s prospects.

Summing up what would become the company’s approach for the rest of the century, Nelson wrote “Our success stems more from deviating than from conforming.”65 “Our” success. This was no mere transactional relationship. Nelson took personal responsibility for the success of this organization, and contributed broadly toward that end. “Designers have been, and are, a part of this business,” he would write in the late 1950s, “involved in not only design, but in marketing, financing, manufacturing and general management.”66 And the organization gave this external figure a key voice in the company’s strategic path. Representing design, Nelson had a seat on the company’s executive committee by the mid-1950s.67 In 1957, D. J. DePree said that he was satisfied that the designers were “tremendously concerned with the product, the customer, and the image of Herman Miller.”68

Perhaps George Nelson’s greatest impact was as a recruiter. Through Nelson, esteemed designers such as Charles Eames, Alexander Girard, and Isamu Noguchi came into the orbit of the company. In addition to acting as recruiter, Nelson would provide his views on appropriate compensation (royalties) to “outside designers” such as Eames.69

Eames, one of the twentieth century’s premiere designers, was the key recruit, beginning working with Herman Miller in 1946. Although Nelson was based in New

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65 Nelson memo 5/3/50.
68 Hugh De Pree, “Attitudes on Design.”
69 Nelson to De Pree, 7/30/46.
York and Eames in Los Angeles, by the end of the 1950s, Nelson and Eames had designed nearly 2,000 pieces for the company.\textsuperscript{70} Thus began a series of relationships that would continue as the company shifted its emphasis to office furniture, including Robert Probst’s “action office” (which featured the cubicle) in the 1960s and 1970s. A pattern was set: The search for the best idea would often lead the company beyond its walls. The division of labor involved the designer deciding what to make, and the company would make it. Along the way, designers would lead the company in directions unimagined by the company’s management.\textsuperscript{71} Herman Miller would be the leading American furniture maker, and the gold standard for design.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The past ten years have brought a profusion of scholarship, much of it associated with Richard Florida, exploring the “creative class” and the correlation of its presence with regional economic vitality.\textsuperscript{72} Florida, who has published widely on the development of high-tech regions, describes the preferences of scientists, artists, engineers, etc. and offers prescriptions on how regions can best attract them. Western Michigan, where Herman Miller is headquartered, has not been one of the urban enclaves supposedly favored by the creative class. Grand Rapids, which once was the nation’s “furniture capital,” and in


\textsuperscript{71} An excellent appraisal of the work of these designers is J. R. Berry, \textit{Herman Miller: The Purpose of Design} (New York, 2004).

whose orbit Herman Miller has operated, appears next to the last (ahead of only Las Vegas) on Richard Florida’s “creative share” list for regions with a population of more than one million. Yet Herman Miller’s development and success has depended on close relationships with some of the more visible and innovative members of the creative class.

Herman Miller’s distinctive business model helped protect it from the built-in conservatism of organizations. New ideas developed within a corporate hierarchy may be nipped in the bud. As Clayton Christensen notes, organizations experiencing success will create templates to sustain that success, templates that may cast out new ideas. One of the roles that outsiders, particularly designers, have played for Herman Miller has been as continuous sources of the new. The use of this open business model helps explain why a company based in Zeeland, Michigan, could become identified with cutting-edge design and the success accruing to that innovation.

Perhaps this means that an amended version of the theory regarding the creative class, industrial location, and economic development is in order. Yes, the nature of the local workforce matters a great deal—otherwise clusters such as Silicon Valley would not have such importance. Yet the extent to which the organizations in a particular region, such as Herman Miller in Western Michigan, operate as part of an open system may overcome apparent regional deficiencies. Openness to new ideas, regardless of source, may be as valuable as proximity to the generators of those ideas.

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