Higher Education in the Knowledge Economy: Politics and Policies of Transformation

Introduction

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American higher education has undergone a far-reaching transformation. More people are attending universities and colleges than ever before, fueled by both increases in the size of the population and rates of attendance. Policy makers, moreover, have strongly supported the sector’s expansion, celebrating universities as “engines of innovation” (Thorp and Goldstein 2010) and promoting education as “the best anti-poverty program” (Obama 2010).

By 2013, 20.4 million students were enrolled in the United States’ degree-granting postsecondary institutions, almost twice as many as during the mid-1980s and 20% more than merely a decade before (NCES 2016, 407–408). These numbers remain remarkable when adjusted to full-time-equivalents (FTE). At public institutions, which educate about three-fourths of the American student population (Desrochers and Wellman 2011, 11), FTE enrollment increased from 7.1 million to 11.5 million between 1987 and 2012 (SHEEO 2013, 9). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) currently estimates that 54% of young adults in the United States will graduate with tertiary degrees during their lifetime. While 22% are expected to attain an associate’s degree only, 38% are projected to gain bachelor’s, 20% master’s, and 1.6% doctoral degrees (OECD 2016, 68).

Yet, behind such perceived successes, structural changes have pushed the sector toward crisis (Blumenstyk 2014). A crucial shift has been the growth of for-profit providers, financed by more than $30 billion of annual student aid flowing from the federal government to education services companies. In 2009, around one in ten American students were enrolled at for-profit institutions (more than tripling the rate over a single decade), with about 86% of the revenues of the 15 publicly traded for-profit institutions coming from public sources (HELP Committee 2010). While these businesses and their investors enjoyed impressive returns, performance in terms of their educational mission has frequently been abysmal, marketing practices have often preyed on the most vulnerable, and employment conditions have tended to be poor.

At the same time, public institutions have been deeply affected by declining direct state and local spending—down to less than $6,000 in annual support per FTE student in 2012 (SHEEO 2013, 21). Seeking to make up revenue shortfalls, public universities increasingly behave as public-private hybrids. Not only have they continually increased tuition, they have also shifted the allocation of financial aid from need to merit as they sought to attract higher-testing students and move up in rankings. They, in turn, contributed to student loan debt rising to more than a trillion dollars, which does not even take into account the second mortgages and other loans that parents often end up taking out to finance their children’s higher education.

Large shares of the American student population now enter the labor market burdened by their obligation to repay substantial debts, a situation that has been characterized as “indentured studenthood” (Shermer 2015) and is made worse by citizens’ frequent inability to discharge student loan debt via personal bankruptcy. At the same time, a plethora of available tax benefits has disproportionately supported the wealthy, ranging from tax-exempt college savings plans to tax deductions for alumni gifts to universities. The non-taxation of endowment returns has also supported upward redistribution, given that endowments have risen to tens of billions for leading private universities and now tend to generate overall returns of $1–3 billion annually.
Universities’ strategies to cope with regressive forms of public spending have undeniably had further regressive effects. Higher education’s impact on social closure and the reproduction of privilege now clearly overpowers the sector’s contribution to social mobility (Mettler 2014). These changes, moreover, have not gone unnoticed by the general population. Three-fourths of Americans view higher education as too expensive to afford for most (Pew Research Center 2011), and a majority finds colleges and universities to be more interested in their bottom lines than in providing a good education (Callan 2010). To make matters worse, American companies have also disinvested from human capital development (Cappelli 2012) and frequently restrict recruitment to students from elite universities (Rivera 2013).

This symposium takes stock of these fundamental political and policy transformations in the higher education sector. It shows how higher education has found itself at the center of broader social conflicts and demonstrates that political science tools are crucial for uncovering how these conflicts are processed politically. Our discipline’s analytic repertoire provides significant leverage for productively exploring the complex causal processes that have shaped the academy’s continuing evolution and have generated a range of consequential outcomes across the world. The symposium develops this argument in four essays penned by newer scholarly voices. Two shorter contributions from more established analysts and two interventions from practitioners provide additional depth and breadth.

While other social science disciplines and the humanities have made substantial progress in addressing the academy’s changing realities, political science has been lagging behind. In exploring what a political science of higher education could look like, the symposium brings together qualitative and quantitative, as well as comparative and historically-embedded analyses. Leveraging the respective strengths of distinct entry points and approaches, the contributions sketch a rich vision for scholarly engagement with the sector’s ongoing evolution and provide a range of suggestions for how policy makers could better translate democratic commitments into policies that fit contemporary socio-economic realities.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE CRUCIBLE: INNOVATION BETWEEN PROMISE AND PERIL

Contemporary changes in American higher education have not occurred in a vacuum. They are part of the sector’s transformation across the world, which has attracted criticism in many countries (e.g., Lenzen 2014; McGettigan 2013). Scholars can better understand the character of higher education’s ongoing transformation—including its roots, features and scope—by placing contemporary US developments into broader historical and geographic contexts.

New thinking about both economic growth and social inclusion has deeply affected the sector. Under the influence of technological change, economic globalization, and the decline of manufacturing, economic experts have come to emphasize the distribution of human capital as central for growth and social equality in knowledge-based economies. Diagnosing a “race between education and technology” (Goldin and Katz 2008) in the name of sustaining “egalitarian” versions of capitalism (Kenworthy 2004), economists and other social scientists have called on policy makers to strengthen human capital investments through tertiary-level education.

The implementation of this agenda has diverged somewhat. In Europe, policy makers dedicated themselves to the Lisbon Agenda, which was supposed to turn the European Union into the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth...” (Lisbon European Council 2000). They also launched the Bologna Process to remove barriers to this agenda by unifying the rules for tertiary students’ workloads and degree requirements across the continent. In many European countries, these reforms introduced bachelor’s degrees as a shorter alternative or complement to traditional MA-level qualifications.

Degree attainment rates for young people in Asia and Europe have tended to increase faster than in the United States, with average expected graduation rates for theory-based academic degrees rising by 20 percentage points across the OECD between 1995 and 2011 (OECD 2013, 55). While the US—together with Canada and Israel—still leads the world in tertiary degree attainment for 55–64 year-old adults, American attainment for 25–34 year-olds has fallen to 12th worldwide (OECD 2016, 42).

Far-reaching changes are even visible in Germany, a country with a history of providing elite-centered higher education and relying heavily on vocation-based education to prepare its workforce. Only a few years ago, Germany stood out (together with the United States) from other OECD countries for having tertiary attainment rates among younger adults that were only marginally higher than for older adults (OECD 2013, 37). Yet, by more than doubling expected lifetime graduation rates for theory-based academic programs between 1995 and 2011, Germany has clearly embraced mass-access higher education (OECD 2013, 63).
National comparisons also reveal great differences in spending on higher education. The United States leads the world with expenditures of 2.6% of GDP, compared to an OECD average of 1.6%. In line with the United States, countries such as Japan, Korea, Canada, and the UK rely heavily on private spending. While both the United States and Germany spend about 1% of GDP in terms of public funds, private contributions in the US far outpace the 0.2% in Germany. European welfare states often invest significant public funds, including as much as 17% of GDP in Finland and Austria (OECD 2016, 207). Many European countries in turn run their mass-access public higher education systems practically tuition-free, in some cases with higher rates of degree completion and frequently with greater efficiency in terms of overall spending per degree than in the US (OECD 2013, 71).

Looking behind the numbers, however, it becomes clear that there are no silver bullets for high performance. In all wealthy democracies, policy makers’ embrace of higher education has generated new financial challenges. First, the expanded sector’s need for increased funding competes with other—also increasing—public expenditures, including services for the elderly or disabled, childcare (particularly in Europe), and prisons (particularly in the US).

“Bowen rule” appear to have been even larger than those of the cost driver theorized by William Baumol (Martin and Hill 2014). Rather than focusing on reducing costs, many American universities have continued to increase investments in the four Rs—rankings, research, real estate, and “rah!” sports (Craig 2015).

Keen to moderate these trends, policy makers have long perceived the need for innovation and the disruption of inherited delivery models (Christensen and Eyring 2011; Wildavsky, Kelly, and Carey 2011). During the past two decades, many countries’ governments have passed laws to encourage universities’ entrepreneurialism, usually by sharpening incentives through competition-enhancing processes of institutional liberalization (Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017). Yet, these reforms’ consequences have often differed from expectations. For instance, the promises of technologically-powered and productivity-increasing tools such as massive open online courses (MOOCs) have yet to be realized. Attempts to integrate them into curricula have frequently encountered roadblocks, leaving them with limited impact to date.

Instead, the consequences of liberalization have frequently highlighted the perils of innovation, many of which flow from the reforms’ effects on shifting distributions of power across the sector. In the United States, policy changes have promoted the progressive financialization of the academy (Eaton et al. 2016), fueling the increasing influence of financial, business and private interests within higher education. Shifts in power have also been visible in other wealthy countries, including in Germany and Scandinavia (Schulze-Cleven and Olson 2017). Because reforms geared toward sustaining competition have frequently meant that public moneys have followed—rather than balanced—private power and spending, they have had a tendency across countries to undermine the accumulation of privilege both within and by way of higher education (Schulze-Cleven 2015). In the context of both winner-take-all markets and politics (Frank and Cook 1996; Hacker and Pierson 2014), higher education’s emancipatory leverage has been greatly reduced.

**TOWARD A POLITICAL SCIENCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION**

To date, the analysis of the sector’s changing politics has been dominated by sociologists, historians, education specialists, and journalists (e.g., Berman 2012; Kirp 2003; Schrecker 2010; Stevens and Gebre-Mehdin 2016). Political scientists have contributed little. While many political scientists have observed higher education’s transformation firsthand at their workplaces, the discipline has not “embraced education as a target of comprehensive, in-depth study” (Moe 2012).

Third, the sector is plagued by what Howard Bowen described as universities’ tendency to raise and spend as much money as they can in their attempts to provide excellence and attain status.
A few exceptions prove the rule. Scholars of American politics have made selected policy interventions on the “fall of the faculty” (Ginsberg 2011) and on students’ increasing inequalities of opportunity (Mettler 2014). Moreover, comparativists have placed higher education within the contexts of comparative welfare-state building and the evolution of capitalist variety (Ansell 2010; Busemeyer 2014; Iversen and Stephens 2008). Finally, disciplinary leaders have used both reflective short pieces and parts of larger projects to warn against disturbing developments in the American academy (Brady 2013; Brown 2015; Scott and Smith 2010). Yet, these efforts have not added up to a research program on the political science of higher education.

Second, the articles demonstrate how these policy feedback effects operate through contrasting—and often interacting—mechanisms. Both Rose and Garritzmann illustrate the role of actors’ ideas and identities in discussing how policies have shaped the public’s views on trade-offs between reform options as well as the populace’s political engagement. Eaton emphasizes how policies’ evolution might change the incentives they provide for actors to join social coalitions in support of policy changes. Finally, Graf and Powell join Eaton and Rose in touching on the effects of policy changes on power relations among actors.

Third, the pieces discuss how the self-reinforcing and self-undermining properties of policy feedbacks shape institutional evolution. This symposium shows that political scientists have much to contribute to a better understanding of the drivers, mechanisms, and consequences of the sector’s evolution by building on Lasswell’s focus on politics as distributitional conflict (Lasswell 1936). Universities contribute to many dimensions of social stratification—from the distribution of income and life chances to gender and racial divisions—and they do so through multiple channels. While it is challenging to conceptualize lines of conflict, trace shifting patterns of contention, and capture ongoing institutional changes, the essays in this symposium demonstrate the promise of this endeavor.

Abstraction based on solid conceptualization allows scholars to address how conflicts get framed and processed. For instance, research could explore higher education as a site of class conflict in modern capitalism, deeply shaped by power and resources having shifted from labor toward capital. Comparative political economy scholarship provides many approaches—from micro-level perspectives to theorizing on interest groups and cross-class coalitions—that could provide effective leverage for such research. Moreover, a discursive perspective could probe the construction of solidarity and joint interests within the labor camp, be it between academic labor and students, or among the academic workforce between tenure-track, non-tenure track, adjunct, and graduate student labor.

Such inquiries could also make important contributions to theorizing on the role of ideas, power and interests behind collective action in modern capitalism more broadly (e.g., Ornston and Schulze-Cleven 2015; Schulze-Cleven and Weishaupt 2015). To highlight this potential, it is worth reviewing the contributions that the symposium’s main essays make to the issue of policy feedback (Hacker and Pierson 2014; Jacobs and Weaver 2015). First, the contributions show how feedback works on different levels, spanning both mass politics—as Garritzm and Rose emphasize—and the interactions of groups, which Eaton elaborates with respect to coalitions among public universities’ constituency groups, and which Graf and Powell probe in their analysis of German employers’ initiatives.

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on social stratification—with the potential to be both socially emancipatory and divisive—provide strong challenges to theory development about the determinants of cross-national patterns. Yet, as Garritzmann reports, scholars have become increasingly sophisticated in meeting these hurdles.

Lukas Graf and Justin Powell’s comparative institutionalist analysis explores the politics of tapping into “dual study” programs as a way to moderate inequalities in school-to-work transitions. Pioneered in Germany, and combining firm-provided practical training and university-based higher education, these hybrid programs enlist employers in funding and developing advanced skill formation, as well as in the provision of inclusive professional opportunities. As such, they provide strong contrasts to recent trends in the United States.

Two shorter contributions by established analysts shed light on the interaction of higher education systems and patterns of labor market stratification, as well as on the complex relationship between education and the welfare state. Ben Ansell and Jane Gingrich show that, depending on labor market structures, the returns to higher education differ greatly across countries. Marius Busemeyer reviews how education policies’ ability to decrease social inequalities turns on countries’ divisions between public and private funding, and between academic and vocational education.

Finally, two interventions by practitioners provide programmatic impetus for a political science of higher education by challenging us to dig even deeper. Matt Reed contributes from the vantage point of a community college administrator and frequent commentator on US higher education policy. His contribution reveals the complex—and arguably at least in part problematic—impact that policy makers’ turn to performance funding has had on community colleges, which are home to over 40% of the American FTE undergraduate population and a majority of undergraduates at public institutions (Desrochers and Wellman 2011). His reflections raise crucial questions about public leadership as a form of democratic governance, its tensions with academic freedom, and the consequences for professional voice. Labor leader Kathryn Lybarger sketches the negative consequences of contemporary higher education reforms for labor standards in the academy. Reporting on union efforts to bargain for the common good, she calls on higher education managers to join emerging coalitions between students and employees’ unions.

While each contribution is clearly focused on a particular set of issues, the essays are highly complementary, sketching a broad research frontier on the politics of higher education and indicating how political science research can play an important role in preparing the ground for a more effective and efficient provision of higher education. By casting light on policy making and by illuminating how institutions shape the character of distributional conflict, political scientists can help remove blockages to collective action that currently hamper the realization of democratic values. ■

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**Profession Symposium: Higher Education in the Knowledge Economy**


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Higher Education and the Transformation of American Citizenship

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On February 24, 2009, during his first joint address to Congress, President Barack Obama boldly declared his goal of returning the United States to its former status as the country with the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by the year 2020 (Obama 2009). To accomplish this feat, the nation would have to increase the number of Americans earning associate’s and bachelor’s degrees by eight million people over the following decade (US Department of Education 2011). With formidable challenges like disparities in college preparedness, the increasing cost of college education, and the growing burden of student loan debt, achieving such dramatic growth in college completion would require Herculean efforts. Nevertheless, success would promote greater social, economic, and political inclusion in society—central building blocks of full citizenship. In what follows, I consider the historical lessons that we can draw from the role that education has played in the transformation of American citizenship since the mid-twentieth century. I make the case that higher education represents a valuable mechanism for promoting equal opportunity, paying particular attention to how federal higher education policies have expanded access to first-class citizenship for women and low-income Americans.

Today, barriers to college education prevent many Americans from achieving the full social, economic, and political inclusion in society that are part and parcel of full citizenship. To address this challenge, lawmakers could consider the feedback effects that higher education policies have historically had for low-income Americans and women. The growing literature on policy feedback demonstrates that government programs have the capacity to alter citizens and reshape the political landscape (Campbell 2002; Hacker 2002; Lowi 1964; McDonagh 2010; Mettler 2005; Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993; Skocpol 1992; Soss 1999; Weaver and Lerman 2010). For example, public policies can increase political engagement by providing incentives that reduce the cost of participating in politics. These incentives can include cash payments, goods, and services—for example, scholarship money or admission to college. Feedback effects can also be transmitted through interpretive (or cognitive) effects, or messages that serve as
a source of political learning for policy beneficiaries and the broader public. These include positive or negative interactions with government officials and agencies, as well as the messages that are conveyed by government program design.

Higher education programs provide powerful examples of how lawmakers can use social policy to empower citizens. Since the mid-nineteenth century, state and federal lawmakers have played a pivotal role in mediating access to college degrees (Garces 2012; Goldrick-Rab et al. 2016; Gurin et al. 2002, 330–334; Rose 2015; Rose 2016). In her book Soldiers to Citizens (2005), for example, Suzanne Mettler demonstrates that the GI Bill helped to democratize higher education in the United States by helping virtually an entire generation of American men as they pursued college degrees. This support was particularly valuable to low-income veterans who would become the first in their families to earn a postsecondary degree. The education that veterans obtained using the GI Bill opened doors to lucrative jobs and facilitated entry into the professions, thus contributing to an expansion of the middle class. It also provided knowledge and skills that facilitated high levels of civic and political involvement.

By designing the GI Bill in a way that made clear veterans’ status as valued citizens and by adopting a style of program administration that facilitated smooth benefit uptake, lawmakers set a clear standard of treatment that recognized beneficiaries’ status as first-class citizens.

By designing the GI Bill in a way that made clear veterans’ status as valued citizens and by adopting a style of program administration that facilitated smooth benefit uptake, lawmakers continue the tradition of using higher education policy to achieve sweeping, citizenship-enhancing expansions in equal opportunity. Yet, the history of higher education policy development reveals a rich legacy of successfully overcoming daunting political obstacles to expand access to higher educational opportunities and, thus, to promote full citizenship (see, e.g., Rose 2016). For example, during the 1940s and early 1950s, efforts to provide broad-reaching financial aid for college students met intense opposition. Opponents took issue with the prospect of the federal government assuming the task of funding college education for young people—a function that had traditionally been reserved for parents and other non-government actors like churches and community organizations (Anderson 2007). Many opponents objected that a federal student aid program would allow the government to interfere with states’ rights, particularly in cases where the receipt of funds would depend on compliance with federal requirements.

Consider, for example, the case of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, Sen. Lister Hill (D-AL) and Rep. Carl Elliott (D-AL) had unsuccessfully advocated for federal scholarship proposals that would have made college more affordable for low-income students. They faced intense opposition from conservative Republicans and their fellow Southern Democrats who vigorously objected on the grounds that the government could use the program as a Trojan horse for federal control, perhaps even gaining leverage to force school desegregation in southern states.
Although challenges like school desegregation and concerns about providing federal funds to parochial schools made government support for education a controversial prospect during the mid-twentieth century, the creation of the NDEA illustrates the value of taking advantage of policy windows to pass sweeping policy reforms. The Soviet Union’s successful launch of the Sputnik satellites in 1957 provided a window of opportunity that gave Hill’s and Elliott’s student aid idea a fighting chance. In the midst of national concern over America’s shocking loss of the space race, efforts to pinpoint the cause of the nation’s lackluster performance in science and technology soon implicated educational shortcomings as the culprit. Recognizing that the national crisis and corresponding increases in public opinion favoring government investment in education could benefit their efforts to pass a federal student aid program, Hill and Elliott strategically re-packaged their existing proposals as “The National Defense Education Act.” As they carefully marshaled the program through the political process, they traded on national anxiety over the Sputnik crisis and Cold War politics, framing student aid as integral to national security. Their masterful political entrepreneurship led to the successful passage of the NDEA, which set a new standard for American higher education policy. It also helped to expand access to full citizenship for millions of Americans by providing unprecedented support for pursuing college degrees.

REGULATORY POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITUTIONS

In addition to overcoming daunting political obstacles, lawmakers’ ability to expand access to full citizenship using social policy depends heavily on the extent to which institutions support—or at least cooperate with—that mission. Take, for example, discrimination in college admissions. By the late 1960s, the federal government provided financial aid that helped to make college affordable for both women and men. Yet, American colleges and universities routinely discriminated against women when making admissions decisions: some schools used gender quotas to limit the number of women admitted each year, while others excluded women entirely. In 1972, lawmakers passed Title IX, which prohibited sex discrimination in college admissions and contributed to important transformations on college campuses (Rose 2015). In addition to prohibiting gender discrimination in admissions, Title IX outlawed sex discrimination in faculty hiring, sexual harassment, and unequal treatment of pregnant or parenting students. It also required that colleges and universities provide women and men with equitable access to on-campus programming, including gender egalitarian support for scholarships, athletic programs, and extracurricular activities.

The passage of Title IX demonstrated the power of regulatory policy for ending overt sex discrimination on college campuses. Moreover, the landmark regulation offers important lessons for how we can address contemporary institutional challenges like the campus sexual assault epidemic. As we have learned in the years since Title IX’s creation, the threat of revoked federal funding represents a powerful incentive for colleges and universities to alter their practices and to ensure equal experiences for members of their campus communities (Rose 2015). In the case of campus safety and protection from sexual assault, Title IX provides a valuable legal basis on which students can base their claims for protection by universities. Increasing students’ awareness of their right to protection and providing access to information about filing Title IX complaints is one way to address this problem. Moreover, the federal government could increase penalties for institutions that fail out of compliance with Title IX on the grounds that they do not effectively handle complaints related to sexual assault and misconduct on campus. As history has shown, regulatory policy represents an effective approach for achieving institutional changes that promote college completion and provide a path to full citizenship for marginalized groups.

The question of whether to provide federal student aid to young adults who have graduated from US high schools but who are not documented citizens points to an important contemporary limit on equal access to higher educational opportunity.

Today, important demographic changes in the United States have raised new questions about access to higher educational institutions and citizenship. The question of whether to provide federal student aid to young adults who have graduated from US high schools but who are not documented citizens points to an important contemporary limit on equal access to higher educational opportunity. In addition to their unauthorized legal status, students who would gain a pathway to citizenship and become eligible for federal student loans and work-study opportunities under the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act—also known as “Dreamers”—are excluded from the higher educational opportunities that are increasingly pivotal to full citizenship. Thus, they have a great stake in whether lawmakers choose to expand access to college degrees using this program. Passing legislation that would enable these students to access federal student aid would indicate a continuing commitment to the tradition of ensuring equal access to higher educational opportunity in the United States.

CONCLUSION: EDUCATING CITIZENS

Historical analysis suggests that the feedback effects of higher education policies have played a crucial role in the transformation of citizenship in the United States. From the GI Bill to the National Defense Education Act, Higher Education Act,
and Title IX, government support for higher education represents one of the most enduring and politically viable mechanisms for expanding equal opportunity and access to full citizenship. As we have seen, the political development of US higher education policy offers valuable examples of how lawmakers can take advantage of policy windows to achieve substantial social policy reform in the face of stalwart opposition. It also demonstrates how lawmakers can use regulatory policy to reshape institutions in ways that promote expanded access to full citizenship. The development of higher education policy also illustrates the connection between public opinion and policy change (see, e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2009). When Americans focused their attention on the shortcomings of higher education in the United States, lawmakers benefited from a more favorable climate for their student aid proposals. Moreover, the creation of new student aid benefits marked significant increases in the number of citizens benefiting from federal higher education policies, thus contributing to their popularity and promoting their sustained existence.

The history of higher education policy provides valuable lessons that lawmakers can draw upon as they work to continue transforming access to full citizenship. It also raises important questions about higher education and the prospect of ongoing transformation. For example, higher education policy development reveals important differences in how political actors and their parties have conceptualized the government’s responsibility when it comes to expanding access to full citizenship. Eras of unified Democratic dominance in Congress have resulted in policies that offered extensive support for traditionally marginalized groups via federal financial aid and regulatory policy. Eras of congressional division or strong Republican political leadership have tended to place greater emphasis on expanding access by way of broad-reaching student loans. In recent decades, increasing concern regarding budget constraints and movement away from grants toward student loans has significantly reshaped the tenor of US higher education policy (Mettler 2014; Patashnik 2004). With the increasing burden of student loan debt, is it possible that the pursuit of higher education operates in tension with economic stability—a central building block of full citizenship?

The development of federal support for higher education also raises questions about how best to tailor policy proposals in light of unique political circumstances. Is it possible to achieve even greater expansions of citizenship by focusing on other areas of education, such as pre-Kindergarten, K-12 education, or vocational training? Have increasing levels of socioeconomic inequality and the challenge of investing in citizens so that they can effectively compete in today’s globalizing economy created a new policy window that lawmakers can use to pass programs that will expand equal educational opportunity? An analytical perspective that emphasizes a long-term view of policy and political development reveals valuable lessons. The extent to which lawmakers can continue to provide access to higher educational opportunities will play a central role in determining who has access to full citizenship in the United States.

NOTES
1. In his path-breaking essay, “Citizenship and Social Class,” sociologist T.H. Marshall defines full citizenship as the possession of equal civil, social, and political rights (1950, 28). Thus, a full citizen possesses freedoms like the right to own property and to be protected under the law, enjoys socioeconomic security, and has the capacity to exercise political power.
2. In many cases, substantial policy reforms that promoted greater access to higher education benefited from significant trends in public opinion that facilitated government activity. In the case of the GI Bill, for example, widespread positive attitudes toward veterans fueled lawmakers’ efforts to reward their service with generous education benefits (Mettler 2005). During the 1950s and 1960s, policy makers significantly expanded the number of Americans who benefited from student aid programs by introducing need-based grants as well as loans and grants that were allocated irrespective of financial need. By increasing the number of citizens who benefited from government support, lawmakers enhanced the probability that political interests would support their continued existence.

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I
n 2010, outstanding US student-loan balances exceeded $1 trillion for the first time and new student-loan origination reached $120 billion (The College Board 2013). Following public outcry at these eye-popping numbers, new coalitions led political mobilizations to change both state and federal policy. Constituency groups of state universities played an outsized role in assembling these coalitions despite America’s large private nonprofit and for-profit higher-education sectors. In the wake of these mobilizations, multiple states froze tuition to limit future borrowing, and new federal policies have eased repayment on existing student debts.

This article asks how state-university constituency groups helped to form these new student-debt coalitions. The inquiry fits with a new historical and sociological research agenda on the intertwined development of US higher education and the US polity (Loss 2011; Stevens and Gebre-Medhin 2016). This scholarship highlights that the emergence of the new student-debt coalitions is surprising because the extremely heterogeneous ecology of US colleges obscures the intelligibility of higher education as a public good. The sector encompasses thousands of public, nonprofit, and for-profit schools with myriad organizational forms, missions, revenue sources, and state-funding arrangements (Shavit, Arum, and Gamoran 2007; Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum 2008; Stevens and Kirst 2015).

To explain the emergence of the new student-debt coalitions from this complex ecology, I build on ideas about the politics of the public-private welfare state in two key ways (Hacker 2002; Morgan and Campbell 2011). First, I add financialization to the picture as a process that must be accounted for since its inception in the 1980s (Davis 2009; Epstein 2005; Krippner 2013; van der Zwan 2014). By financialization, I mean the increasing power of financial-sector actors and their ideas throughout society and the economy. Financialization can introduce new social pressures and market instabilities into public-private social programs that involve government resources and regulations as well as private providers. We can see this dynamic of financialization at work in the 1992 expansion of federal student loans. Paradoxically, this expansion of a government program contributed to a market dynamic that rapidly increases tuition rates in ways that are typical of consumer costs in the provision of public goods by private nonprofit and for-profit organizations (Berman and Stivers 2016).

Yet, public universities have also been pressured to increase tuition revenue financed by student debt, particularly during the economic malaise since the end of the 1990s (Eaton, Brady, and Stiles 2016). As state-owned educational providers, however, public universities maintain strong public constituencies that can mobilize to defend and expand expected benefits (Pierson 1995). This persistent public quality of state universities has made them an important base for building new political coalitions around student debt.

Second, I propose an explanation that is missing from public-private welfare-state scholarship for how policy coalitions may arise around such a complicated social policy as student loans and in an equally complex ecology of postsecondary-education providers. I argue that coalitions connect diverse organizations with members who have a stake in policy problems that otherwise might go unnoticed in the complex and obscure workings of modern social policy (Eaton and Weir 2013; Hacker 2002; Mettler 2011). In this way, organizations can become involved in policy fights that were not previously central to their mission. Critically, these coalitions can include unions of workers in social-policy sectors that provide political “muscle” and infrastructure. The new student-debt coalitions also enlist broader liberal, youth, student, and low-income community-based organizations.

I provide evidence for my argument by comparing the emergence of new coalitions in California and nationally since 2010. I use this comparison to show how public-university constituency coalitions engaged first in more directly intelligible fights over state funding and then in the more abstract fights over federal student-loan policies. The California case also is important in its own right because the University of California (UC) is an iconic ideal type as a strong public-university system in the national imaginary of public education. On the one hand, this imaginary could promote expectations of affordability and accessibility that are violated by rising student debt. On the other hand, the imaginary could make it difficult for constituency groups to perceive the threat of student loans.

Before turning to evidence from the cases, I first review how student loans can create a market dynamic of rising tuition at state universities without fundamentally altering their public ownership, governance, and symbolism. I develop this argument by drawing on theories of financialization.
FINANCIALIZATION AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE
The formation of the new student-debt coalitions was prompted by rising tuition and student debt. This involved a process that is missing from current theories of the public-private welfare state: financialization, which is the resurgence of financial-sector investors, managers, organizations, and ideas (Davis 2009; Krippner 2011; van der Zwan 2014). Financialization has led to the adoption of financial ideologies by corporations, governments, nonprofits, and households alike. The ideology calls for the individualization of risk and the allocation of resources where they likely yield the highest rate of return for investors (Davis 2009). Within this ideological frame, a major expansion of federal student loans was pushed through Congress in 1992 by the private banks that received subsidies to offer the loans (Berman and Stivers 2016, 139).

The expansion of federal student loans in 1992 contributed to a much broader financialization of US higher education (Eaton, Brady, and Stiles 2016). States reduced direct appropriations to higher education and public postsecondary institutions joined their private counterparts in increasing revenue from student-loan–financed tuition charges. This created a dynamic of market instability in a complex of major government programs. Public universities are most pressured to increase tuition revenue to offset state-funding cuts during recession and stagnation. Students and their households then must take on more student debt precisely when they are most anxious about future job prospects and their ability to repay debts. This compounds a lifetime of diminished-earnings potential because students who graduate during a recession are red-flagged for being unemployed or underemployed (Kahn 2010).

Students and their households then must take on more student debt precisely when they are most anxious about future job prospects and their ability to repay debts.

These new pressures and volatilities involving student debt persist even as the US student-loan system becomes more dominated by the federal government. The backlash against student loans actually escalated following the effective nationalization of federal student loans in 2010. That year, congressional legislation eliminated the prior role for private financial institutions in government lending programs (Berman and Stivers 2016). This underscores that financialization can contribute to market instabilities even when both loans and universities are publicly owned and governed.

IN PLAIN SIGHT: PERSISTENCE OF THE PUBLIC IN FINANCED HIGHER EDUCATION
As financialization advances through the expansion of student loans, I argue that public universities should maintain broad, organized constituencies—including student organizations and public-employee unions—that can mobilize to defend and expand expected benefits. Such strong public constituencies are a common feature of extensive, publicly provided social benefits (Pierson 1995). This flows in part from broad groups receiving benefits from the same government program under a single banner (e.g., Medicare and Social Security). Similarly, public-university systems are large in scale, enrolling hundreds of thousands of students in more populous states. Public universities, moreover, award 63% of all bachelor degrees in the United States (National Center for Education Statistics 2016). In contrast, beneficiary groups tend to be fragmented and weak when they receive benefits such as health care and retirement support through private programs (Hacker 2002). The persistence of strong organized constituencies at state universities, therefore, should provide a stronger social base for student-loan mobilizations than constituencies at private schools.

Student debt also should more easily be seen as a policy issue at state universities because of public ownership and governance. Scholars have rightly noted that the essential roles of government, policy, and state funding are especially difficult for constituencies to see in the case of privately delivered benefits (Mettler 2011). State universities, however, are broadly recognized by citizens as public institutions from which they expect affordable services. Under state ownership, tuition is publicly governed through public deliberations and democratic processes involving legislatures or state-appointed boards. Therefore, I expect it has been easier to view student debt as a public-policy issue that is directly shaped by political struggles over tuition-setting.

STUDENTS, LABOR, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COALITIONS
Even at public universities, coalitions may be necessary to reveal policies that are obscure in submerged and delegated private-public provision (Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011). Coalitions connect diverse organizations with members who have a stake in policy problems that otherwise might go unnoticed. Organizations even can become involved in policy fights that were not previously central to their mission.

Public-university student associations should play a key role in initiating new student-debt coalitions. Students are the most directly impacted higher-education beneficiaries from the rise of student debt. Student associations and student unions historically have been the primary advocacy organizations for students on issues of affordability and access on campus, in state politics, and nationally (Eaton 2002).

As with mobilizations to expand public-private benefits in health care, housing, and retirement, we should expect unions to be central to the new student-debt coalitions (Eaton and Weir 2015; Gottschalk 2000; Hacker 2002; Thurston 2013). Public-university employee unions might see student debt as a threat to stable state funding in support of employee benefits.
Higher Education in the Knowledge Economy

Consistent with my argument, students from UC and CSU then formed a formal “Refund California” coalition with 24 different UC, CSU, and community-college unions, student associations, and faculty associations (Rosenhall 2011). In December, the coalition backed the filing of a “Millionaire’s Tax” ballot initiative by the California Federation of Teachers (CFT), one of the most powerful members of the coalition.

Amid the larger Occupy Wall Street protests, the Refund coalition organized large-scale student protests at UC, CSU, California community colleges, and the California State Capitol. More than 10,000 students engaged in walkouts and sit-ins on multiple occasions between November and April of 2012. The actions were strategically directed at university executives, state officials, and banks associated with student-loan borrowing. Against this backdrop, California Governor Jerry Brown and the CFT agreed to jointly back Proposition 30, a modified version of the “Millionaire’s Tax” ballot initiative. Proposition 30 ultimately would include a tuition payments by steadily shifting the balance of financial aid from need-based Pell Grants to federal student loans (Berman and Stivers 2016; Geiger 2002). Students can use both federal-loan and grant aid to pay for tuition and college expenses at a public or private college of their choice.

Nevertheless, public-university student groups and labor unions played a primary role in founding Higher Ed Not Debt, the main national student-debt coalition. The coalition emerged later than the California coalition and focuses on more distant and arcane proposals to ease repayment requirements for existing and new student loans. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), Center for American Progress (CAP), the Demos think-tank, and Jobs with Justice labor-community alliance took the lead to convene Higher Ed Not Debt in 2013, more than a year after the founding of the California coalition. CAP’s Generation Progress, AFT’s public-university membership, and Jobs with Justice provided long-standing organizational ties to the US Student Association (USSA).
As a national federation of public-university student governments, USSA brought this key constituency to the 2013 founding of Higher Ed Not Debt.

Since its founding, Higher Ed Not Debt has pushed particularly for proposals that would reduce costs for current and new student-loan borrowers from both public and private colleges. This includes congressional proposals to reduce interest rates for new loans, executive actions to stop aggressive student-debt collection practices by federal subcontractors, and proposals for progressive income-based loan-repayment rates and forgiveness. In 2014, the coalition also began to call for stronger consumer protections at for-profit colleges, including those facing unionization drives among faculty by the SEIU.

**Comparing Coalition Participants in California and Nationally**

Whereas liberal think-tanks play a key role in the national coalition, public-university students and labor provide critical support for both the California and the national coalitions. Table 1 illustrates this by showing the main organizations that consistently participated in the California coalition, the national coalition, or both. There is considerable overlap between the two coalitions with the four largest education unions, the main student association (i.e., USSA), and their affiliates participating in both. Participation in the California coalition is more overwhelmingly state-university-driven with only three of 13 consistent coalition partners coming from outside public universities. In contrast, 15 of 23 national-coalition participants come from outside public-university constituencies.

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<th>Table 1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition Participants in California and Nationally</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>California Only</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education, Students, and Youth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Senate of California's Community Colleges</td>
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<td>Council of UC Faculty Associations</td>
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<td>UAW Academic Employee Unions</td>
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<td>UC Clerical Employees Union – Teamsters</td>
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<td>UC University Professional and Technical Employees – Communications Workers</td>
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<td><strong>Labor</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
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<td>Courage Campaign</td>
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Source: HigherEdNotDebt.org and California coalition documents obtained by author.

Nevertheless, public-university groups played an important role in establishing the national coalition.

**MISSING IN ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS**

Amid pressure from Bernie Sanders and consultations with the new student-debt coalitions, Hillary Clinton adopted free public higher education as a major plank in her 2016 presidential campaign. Clinton’s proposal promised tens of billions in new federal funding for public institutions to offer tuition-free enrollment to students from households earning less than $125,000 per year (Rappeport 2016). Even with Clinton’s backing, such a proposal would have faced steep obstacles from conservatives to either congressional passage or state-level implementation.

Coalition efforts for a comparable expansion of benefits under Obamacare succeeded only after alliances were formed with a subset of insurance and health-service providers (Eaton and Weir 2015). Similar alliances have not yet emerged with the new student-debt coalitions.

University presidents and university associations have had a comparatively low profile in the last decade of policy struggles over student debt. California’s public-university systems and the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities have taken the peculiar posture of claiming that student debt is not a problem. This argument oddly contradicts their calls to increase public funding as an alternative to increased tuition and student debt.

Why have state-university officials—a potential natural ally for the new student-debt coalitions—taken this course? Is it in line with historical tensions around issues
of university autonomy? Or is it a product of newer financial ideologies and market pressures? Concerted scholarly attention will be necessary to make sense of these questions involving the political evolution of US higher education. Problems of college debt, costs, and accountability are unlikely to become any smaller until we better understand the political and social dynamics that have led us to where we are. In this project, we will need all of the political science we can get.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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NOTES


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Higher education is a mixed blessing: it can promote equality of opportunity, foster educational and socioeconomic upward mobility, contribute to countries’ knowledge production and economic growth, and even lead to higher levels of health and life satisfaction. However, higher education also can be a tool of the reproduction of existing elites, it can plunge students into lifelong debt, and it can cause “negative redistribution” from the poor to the rich because the better-off are more likely to benefit from publicly funded college. Thus, depending on the composition of an existing education system, higher education can either mitigate or reinforce prevailing social, economic, and educational inequalities.

These complex (re)distributive dynamics make higher education an extremely interesting and relevant field of study for political scientists, particularly regarding the role of political parties. Do left-wing parties expand higher education (i.e., spending) because of its progressive implications, or are right-wing parties the main proponent because of its regressive consequences?

This article reviews the state of the art of the existing country-comparative literature on the partisan politics of higher education in advanced democracies. I argue that important variations in higher-education systems can be understood only by considering the partisan politics behind these regimes. The argument and the literature on which it is based are presented as follows. I begin by discussing early studies inspired by welfare-state research, positing that parties have continuously exercised strong influence on higher-education systems. The main question in this literature was whether left-wing or right-wing parties expand higher education. Second, I turn to newer approaches, arguing that the effect of parties is not this simple and linear but rather conditional on the status quo of the specific education system and the type of spending. Third, against this background, I examine approaches claiming that the impact of parties on higher-education policy has decreased over time, which is attributed to positive feedback effects resulting in path dependencies.

The article concentrates on comparative work of the advanced economies between 1945 and 2015, which is mainly quantitative because it focuses on quantifiable comparable outcomes, such as public spending and enrollment levels. This international perspective helps in understanding the complex politics of higher education and provides lessons for policy makers and practitioners around the globe. Yet, this perspective also has blind spots, and I outline both for future research in the concluding section.

THE PROGRESSIVE NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A TOPIC OF THE POLITICAL LEFT?

Comparative political scientists neglected education policies for a long time (for detailed reviews, see Busemeyer and Trampusch [2011] and Iversen and Stephens [2008]). When they finally discovered the field in the 1990s, the first comparative analyses derived expectations from welfare-state research and hypothesized that the politics of education resemble those of other social policies. That is, in line with Power Resource Theory, left-wing governments were expected to expand public-education spending because education fosters equality of opportunity, social upward mobility, and redistribution (Castles 1989). Similarly, education spending in left-wing–dominated Scandinavia is much higher than under conservative rule in Continental and Southern Europe. Boix (1998) argued, moreover, that the Left’s focus on education should even strengthen over time because, in a globalized world, their demand-side–oriented Keynesian policies become ineffective. Looking for new strategies to pursue their goals, leftist parties therefore would increasingly focus on supply-side policies—education being a prime example. Adding to this reasoning, Busemeyer (2009) maintained that Social Democrats since the 1980s increasingly tried to attract middle-class voters and therefore emphasized higher education as a means to appeal to their interests.

In short, a consensus among scholars inspired from welfare-state research was that the politics of higher education closely resemble those of other social policies; that is, left-wing parties spend more on education. (See Garritzmann and Seng [2016] for a more encompassing literature review on the role of political parties in education policy.)

THE REGRESSIVE NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A TOPIC OF THE POLITICAL RIGHT?

Higher education, however, has characteristics that challenge the notion that public spending has progressive redistributive consequences in the interest of left-wing parties and their voters. As a broad socioeconomic literature demonstrates (Breen and Jonsson 2005), access to higher education historically has been—and remains until present day—dependent on parental background in all advanced democracies. The children of richer and better-educated parents are more likely to attend universities than their less-privileged classmates; moreover,
they are more likely to study in more prestigious institutions and programs. Although the size of this effect differs across countries and time, the general pattern is clear: access to higher education is stratified by parental background.

Consequently, public spending on higher-education institutions, in fact, is not fiscally progressive but rather regressive because the children of better-off families benefit disproportionately from public tax money, resulting in negative redistribution from the poor to the rich (Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). Notably, Karl Marx criticized this fact 120 years ago: “When in some countries higher-education institutions are ‘free-of-charge,’ this only means covering the rich offspring’s education costs from public tax coffers” (Marx 1973 [1890/1891]; my translation). It is this fact that makes the politics of higher education such a fascinating and relevant but also complex phenomenon. In this sense, Wilensky’s (1975, 3) dictum that, compared to other social policies, “education is special” applies particularly to higher education.

Consequently, public spending on higher-education institutions, in fact, is not fiscally progressive but rather regressive because the children of better-off families benefit disproportionately from public tax money, resulting in negative redistribution from the poor to the rich (Fernandez and Rogerson 1995).

Against this background, some scholars have argued that rather than being promoted by left-wing parties, conservative parties and their upper-/upper-middle-income constituency expand public spending on higher education (Jensen 2011).

**THE (COMPLEX) POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION: TOWARD CONDITIONAL PARTISAN MODELS**

Overall, then, a puzzle emerges. Do left-wing parties expand higher education (i.e., spending and enrollment) because it can provide socioeconomic and educational upward mobility? Or are right-wing parties the main proponent because it is mainly their constituency that benefits? To unravel these puzzling findings, a more recent literature challenges the perspective that the effect of parties is simple and linear by highlighting variation across time and across types of spending.

**Enrollment Levels Shape Politics**

A first important argument was that the influence of parties might depend on the institutional context. In an important contribution to the field, Ansell (2008, 2010) argued that political conflict over and effects of parties on higher education depend on the enrollment level (i.e., the proportion of each cohort attending higher-education schools). As long as enrollment levels are low, students mainly come from upper socioeconomic strata (as discussed previously). Thus, Ansell expected right-wing parties, representing these voters, to increase public higher-education spending, whereas left-wing parties would be opposed because their lower-income constituency is less likely to benefit. Instead, left-wing parties are theorized—following Marx’s advice—to favor private spending (i.e., tuition fees) so that students at least pay partly for their own education.

When enrollment levels become more universal and lower-strata children have a realistic chance of achieving access to college, however, Ansell reasons that the partisan dynamics reverse. In this scenario, left-wing parties should favor further expansion to enable their constituency to attend college. Right-wing parties, in contrast, now oppose further expansion because they prefer to keep higher education exclusive. In short, “the impact of partisanship is conditional” on the enrollment level and changes over time (Ansell 2008, 191).

**Disaggregating Types of Spending**

Overall, the “conditional-partisan-effect model” is straightforward and a great approach to start dissolving the earlier contradictory findings. The model’s blind spot, however, is how enrollment levels change in the first place. Enrollment is the crucial mediating variable, fundamentally changing the politics of higher education—but enrollment itself is treated as exogeously given. The questions of why enrollment levels increase at all and why they should ever reach the “tipping point” remain somewhat understudied (particularly empirically). Conservative parties could anticipate this and stop the expansion before it reaches the tipping point—as happened, for example, in Japan.

More recent approaches tried to resolve these questions by disaggregating spending into different types. Garritzmann (2016) distinguishes public spending on higher-education institutions from spending on students (i.e., financial aid), arguing that both have different political dynamics. This distinction shows that public spending is not automatically fiscally regressive even when enrollment levels are low because governments can target spending to lower strata by investing in student financial aid. Thus, whereas Ansell’s (2008, 2010) argument about reversing party positions might apply to public spending on higher-education institutions, it does not hold for more targeted spending on student aid. Empirically, this indeed is the case because qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that left-wing governments in all advanced economies across the entire postwar period tried to increase spending on student financial aid, irrespective of the specific composition of the education system (Garritzmann 2016).

At the same time, distinguishing types of spending discounts the assumption that enrollment levels are exogenous to the political process. Left-wing parties can affect enrollment levels and the socioeconomic composition of the student body using financial aid. A broad sociopsychological literature confirms that student subsidies have strong positive effects on their enrollment decisions and studying behavior, particularly...
higher-education funding systems differ? This question is particularly pressing because in the immediate post–World War II period, the higher-education systems of all advanced democracies were still highly similar. Enrollment rates were approximately 2% to 5%, tuition was absent or very low, and public student financial aid was nonexistent. Currently, however, “Four Worlds of Student Finance” (Garritzmann 2015, 2016) demonstrate very different combinations of public and private spending.

To explain why the advanced democracies developed such different higher-education systems, Garritzmann (2016)—following Ansell and the previous literature—also identified governing parties as the key actor shaping them but points to the crucial role of a party’s duration in office as well. He developed a “Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory” to explain the emergence of the Four Worlds.

In the first group of countries, left-wing parties were predominant in government throughout the entire postwar period (e.g., Sweden). Left-wing parties had already established student financial aid in the 1940s and 1950s, increased enrollment rates considerably (especially among formerly disadvantaged groups), and ensured that no tuition fees were required. Over time, these left-wing–dominated countries established low-tuition–high-subsidy systems. In the second country group, right-wing parties dominated office during the postwar decades (e.g., in Japan). These parties were more interested in maintaining the quality of their elite higher-education institutions than expanding access, so they focused resources on the few public elite schools and provided little support to other students. Consequently, the entire enrollment expansion was captured by the private sector, which naturally was highly tuition-dependent. Over time, therefore, right-wing–dominated countries developed high-tuition–low-subsidy regimes.

In the third country cluster, exemplified by Germany, left-wing parties governed for only a short period before right-wing parties took back office. Left-wing parties thus tried to establish subsidies and expand enrollment of lower-strata children. However, they were unsuccessful in these attempts in the long run because subsequent right-wing governments simply retrenched the subsidy spending and returned to the low-tuition–low-subsidy combination. In the fourth cluster, left-wing governments were in office long enough to establish student financial aid. It was therefore not feasible for subsequent right-wing governments to reestablish it (discussed in the next section). This was the case, for example, in the United States (Mettler 2002). Here, subsequent right-wing governments switched to their second-order preference, pushing for student loans instead of grants and allowing tuition increases.

As a result, countries under this government composition today have high-tuition–high-subsidy systems.

The Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory finds strong empirical support in both historical comparative case studies over seven decades and in quantitative analyses of party positions, effects of parties on public and private spending, and public opinion (Garritzmann 2016). The partisan composition of governments and their duration in office can explain the historical emergence of the Four Worlds of Student Finance. Taken together, both Ansell (2008, 2010) and Garritzmann (2016) showed that the complex (re)distributive dynamics of higher education and the politics behind them can be disentangled once political conflict over education is considered in context.

Why Policy Change Becomes Increasingly Difficult: That Is, Why “Tuition-Free College” Will Not Happen in the United States

So far, this article has focused on the party-political origins of higher-education systems, showing how and under what conditions governing parties shaped them in line with their preferences. A final strand in the literature argued that although parties exercised significant influence on higher-education systems from the 1940s to the 1980s, their impact apparently has vanished in the more recent phase (Busemeyer 2015; Garritzmann and Seng 2016). Instead, all countries’ higher-education systems have increasingly become path-dependent. Countries such as the United States and Japan, for example, which rely heavily on tuition fees, have further increased tuition, whereas there are no attempts to establish fees in tuition-free countries such as Finland and Germany. Why is this the case?

To explain this, a number of recent studies point to the power of “positive feedback effects,” following Pierson’s (1993) seminal work. Pierson argued that, over time, policies can “generate their own support” as beneficiary groups become vocal supporters, thereby making retrenchment
increasingly unlikely. Mettler (2002) transferred these arguments to education, showing how in the United States, education policies shape public opinion and citizens’ behavior. Busemeyer (2015) made similar arguments for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, which Garritzmann (2015, 2016) applied to higher education. He shows how, over time, public opinion adapts to a specific higher-education system, thereby making radical policy change increasingly costly for political parties.

In other words, the policy menu of political parties decreases over time. In tuition-free Scandinavia, for example, parties will simply not impose tuition because the large majority of voters strongly oppose private-education expenditure.

The Literature’s Blind Spots—Some Open Questions

So far, the existing comparative literature on the role of political parties in higher-education policies has focused primarily on policy outcomes that are quantitatively comparable across countries and time (e.g., different types of public and private spending and enrollment levels). Many other interesting aspects have been disregarded—mainly because they are more difficult to capture empirically—and remain promising tasks for future research. First, do parties also affect higher-education governance, the quality of higher education, teaching content, research production, and other important outputs? In a recent explorative study, Jungblut (2016), for example, analyzed party positions on higher-education governance, showing that they also vary along party ideological lines. Thus, an interesting working hypothesis could be that whereas partisan influence on higher-education funding has decreased over time due to positive feedback effects, parties increasingly focus on affecting governance to continue shaping higher-education systems in line with their preferences.

Second, other political actors including unions, employer associations, and several types of interest groups do not feature prominently in the comparative literature; however, they are significant in some country-specific studies (e.g., in the United States) (Ness, Tandberg, and McLendon 2015). This might be due to the fact that in most advanced economies, the influence of vested interests on higher education might be weaker than that of governing parties; however, we simply do not know yet. Thus, future research could ask: How do parties and other politico-economic actors jointly shape higher-education systems?

Third, analysis of the partisan politics of higher education should be more closely related to those of other education sectors, such as vocational education, training, and child care. A comparison with child care seems especially worthwhile in this respect because both seem to follow a similar (re)distributive logic; use of child care is de facto also stratified by parental background (Van Lancker 2014). Thus, the politics of child care can be assumed to follow a similar logic as those of higher education. Projecting this way, more closely connecting the analysis of education and social policies seems to be a worthwhile task.

Discussion

This article reviews the country-comparative literature on the partisan politics of higher education. It shows that due to the complex (re)distributive effects of higher-education policies, the politics behind them are not as straightforward as early contributions to the field assumed. Recent efforts in the field have begun unraveling the complex dynamics by situating partisan politics in context and by differentiating among several types of spending.

Overall, the country-comparative perspective has merit and draws implications not only for scholars but also for policy makers and practitioners. For one, the comparative perspective teaches us that political actors have significant room to maneuver as long as the higher-education systems are still in their infancy. Once the systems have developed in a particular direction (e.g., a strong tuition dependence), however, path dependencies prevail and radical policy change becomes increasingly costly for governing parties. Therefore, the careful design of the higher-education system is an extremely important and relevant factor during defining political moments (i.e., critical junctures).

In less abstract forms, consider the current debates in South Africa, Chile, and other emerging economies. Many advisors—particularly economists—often stress that developing countries should establish tuition fees because the better-off are more likely to study (following Marx’s argument). This is true, but it also is shortsighted advice. In the long run, this will probably lead to the persistence of inequalities because the ever-increasing tuition fees that will be the consequence of such a policy (as shown in the path-dependency literature) will deter...
NOTES

1. In this vein, the quantitative expansion of higher education does not necessarily imply more equality. Ahola (1995) showed that for the Finnish case (a least-likely case in this respect), for example, whereas enrollment levels increased among all socioeconomic strata, higher-strata children were more likely to study in more prestigious programs (e.g., medicine and law). Stated bluntly, we could argue that the stratification simply moved from “outside” the education sector “into” the higher-education sector.

2. Due to limited space, this article focuses on country-comparative literature and disregards country-specific studies. However, country-specific studies exist, particularly regarding the United States. For example, Doyle (2012); McLendon, Hearrn, and Mokher (2009); and Ness, Tandberg, and McLendon (2015) explored variations across the US states.

3. The path-dependency argument applies particularly to radical and visible policy change. There still might be room for more subtle incremental—yet potentially also regime-transformative—policy change, in line with recent historical work on institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005). For example, the introduction of tuition fees for non–European Union/European Economic Area students in some Scandinavian countries might become a “back door” to establish some type of tuition fees for other students as well. At present, however, there is no empirical sign of this because the involved political actors (especially student unions) articulate strong and vocal opposition, making it highly costly for political parties to proceed in this direction.

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How Employer Interests and Investments Shape Advanced Skill Formation

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In many countries around the world, higher education today offers the most assured pathways to secure careers and low unemployment rates. Yet, increasingly some groups—not least the college graduates and their families who are paying ever-higher tuition fees—question the long taken-for-granted contributions that higher education makes to individuals and society as a whole (Schulze-Cleven 2015). Despite mass expansion, societies struggle to achieve their goal of “college for all”—in part to limited public or corporate funding for affordable study opportunities. Although participation rates have climbed worldwide, higher-education systems continue to produce winners (“insiders”) and losers (“outsiders”), even as the “schooled society” shifts the occupational structure upward (Baker 2014). Furthermore, market-oriented higher-education systems, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom, face increasing privatization, which also involves financializing university governance (see Eaton in this symposium). Many states have retrenched investments that had once underwritten the flourishing of universities and their moves toward massification. Tensions have deepened over who should pay for rising costs (see Garritzmann in this symposium), exacerbated in an era of increasing status competition via higher education. In the face of such challenges globally, which alternatives exist?

A prominent possibility, pioneered in Germany in the 1970s, is the “dual-study” program. These hybrid programs fully integrate phases of higher-education study and paid work in firms; students are simultaneously trainees. In the short term, firms receive inexpensive labor; in the medium term, they benefit from personnel trained in the relevant context. Yet, firms invest not only in recruiting and training motivated future full-fledged employees. They also collaborate with higher-education institutions to develop specific curricula that promise to craft skilled workers needed in the future. In these programs, employers and educators cooperate to provide coursework in “dual”-learning settings: on campus and in the workplace. Together, they shape a labor force oriented toward current challenges and opportunities in specific sectors, such as engineering and economics or business.

Dual-study programs manifest ways in which employer interests and investments are shaping advanced skill formation. They produce new skills at the nexus of higher education and workplace-based training. We argue that contemporary developments in Germany provide an innovative approach to simultaneously strengthen education and the economy. Co-developed and co-financed by employers, these programs have many advantages. Benefits include encouraging employers to at least partially fund their own skill supply. This could moderate the global trend toward saddling students and families with ever-higher education costs and debt.

Grounded in neo-institutional analysis, expert interviews, and document analysis, we focus on the relationship between higher education and firms in Germany, Europe’s largest economy. First, we introduce the historical-institutional context of advanced skill formation in Germany. Second, we analyze the rapid expansion of dual-study programs. In particular, we emphasize the importance of employer interests and highlight distributional conflict in the new politics of skill investment. Third, we present lessons that the United States might learn from these hybrid programs.

CHARACTERIZING ADVANCED SKILL FORMATION IN GERMANY

Germany, the birthplace of the modern research university (Baker 2014), has among the strongest research-intensive higher-education systems in Europe, and it continues to be a reference point for other countries across disciplines. In contrast to heavily market-oriented systems such as in the United States, higher education in Germany is considered a public good and is provided nearly tuition-free regardless of nationality. This is also due to student protests against implementation of tuition fees (Hüther and Krücken 2014).

Simultaneously, Germany’s traditional secondary-level apprenticeship system, which links workplace training with vocational schooling in particular occupations, also continues to be attractive globally (Euler 2013; Powell and Solga 2010). Dual apprenticeship training at the upper-secondary level has a celebrated history in Germany, firmly embedded in corporatist governance structures that involve employer and employee representatives from business associations and unions as so-called social partners (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012). These programs lead to recognized certification according to the Vocational Training Act and the...
Crafts Code, thereby governing access to specific occupations (Thelen 2004).

Both higher education and vocational training in Germany have often provided policy inspiration for other countries (Phillips 2011). However, the German skill-forming system is currently undergoing reforms to address lacking institutional permeability between the organizational fields of higher education and vocational training (Graf 2013). Indeed, the strengths of these fields—each defined by distinct rules, norms, and practices—led to a persistent divide between them, known as the “educational schism” (Baethge and Wolter 2015). This division has long hindered educational and social mobility and today presents a major problem, not least due to socio-economic developments such as the growth of the knowledge economy, tertiarization, and increasing educational expectations. In this context, dual-study programs—operating at the higher-education level—can provide answers because they promise to facilitate needed flexibility in educational careers and lifelong learning for all. Yet, how did these “hybrid” programs at the nexus of vocational training and higher education emerge?

THE EXPANSION OF WORK-BASED HYBRID STUDY PROGRAMS IN GERMANY

German employers, especially in manufacturing, initially launched dual-study programs to ensure the practical relevance of the academic skills that higher-education graduates acquire. Responding to this challenge, employers in the 1970s began to cooperate with various types of educational organizations to build dual work-based academic programs at a higher level. By uniting firm-based training with postsecondary academic education in applied courses of study, these new hybrid programs facilitate making the most of technological change and academic upgrading of curricula.

In the past decade, this unique feature of Germany’s higher-education system has expanded markedly (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung 2015). In joining elements of apprenticeship training and higher education, this specific type of work-based higher education accomplishes institutional-boundary spanning, especially with regard to curricula, teaching staff, and funding. Such connections between the learning environments of the firm and the academy extend far beyond the summer internship or abbreviated on-the-job training common in the United States. When teachers in academic organizations and employers work together in systematic ways to design curricula, they ensure that students have learning opportunities guided not only by academic faculty but also by company experts. Employers cover the costs of training during the praxis term, paying students for their work and studies, and thereby reducing the financial burden on families. Dual studies provide a sought-after pathway for young adults to learn and earn simultaneously, which—crucially—enables young adults to jumpstart their careers. For employers, these programs attract, mature, and maintain valuable talent.

The core principle of these programs is their interactive combination of the workplace and the seminar room. These two distinct learning environments offer necessary but differing opportunities to gain practical and academic knowledge. Dual-study programs are most common in economics, engineering, and computer science, but they also are growing in other disciplines, such as health-related fields (Graf et al. 2014). Thus far, subjects have been concentrated in areas close to growing economic sectors. Students apply directly to the firm, which in turn collaborates with the university to provide academic education. All involved parties—the student, the firm, and the university—are bound by a formal agreement, and students continue with the same firm for their entire undergraduate study period. The firm is responsible for financing the in-firm training. It also pays the student a salary, typically equivalent to or higher than that received by traditional apprentices in the respective industry. A large portion of the costs for the program’s academic part is state-financed because most dual-study programs are offered through public universities (of applied sciences). However, when firms cooperate with a private university, they usually cover much or all of the incurred costs.

Dual-study programs usually lead to a bachelor’s degree in about three to four years (dual studies at the master’s level are still rare but also expanding) and connect two didactic principles: namely, scientific grounding and practical training. The original type of dual-study programs integrates an initial vocational-training certificate. Here, graduates attain double qualifications—an upper-secondary-level vocational-training certificate and a bachelor’s degree from the university, thereby improving access to specific occupations.

Notably, the impressive recent expansion of such work-based higher-education programs in Germany is due more to employer initiative rather than government or party politics. Whereas in Germany, state (i.e., Länder) governments as well as the federal government are the decisive players in regulating and financing higher education, this is only partly true for dual-study programs. Rather, collaboration between employers and universities is crucial, with these programs developed from the bottom up (Graf 2013). This is indicative of an innovative development in German higher education that resonates with certain developments in the United States. What has long been acknowledged and valorized in the United States—namely, that higher-education institutions are strong...
organizational actors in their own right—is increasingly evident in Germany as differentiation proceeds and universities develop more specific profiles.

This emergent field of work-based higher education exhibits similar cleavages and coordination challenges that exist in the traditional dual-training system. Key arenas of contention include the provision of training and its financing as well as the related mechanism of control and public oversight (see Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012 on dual training at the secondary level) but also the conflictual politics of general versus specific skills more broadly (Streeck 2012). In the seems to be left behind is the union, traditionally a key partner in German skill formation. Whereas German unions concentrate on the governance of traditional dual-apprenticeship training, their attention to developments in higher education has been limited as they struggle to win tertiary graduates as a major new source of members. Thus, in an era of structural changes in the economy and rising educational expectations and attainment, unions have difficulty in realizing opportunities with regard to strategies for advanced workplace-based training. This is even more relevant given that a lack of union involvement could result in these programs focusing too narrowly on firm-specific skills.

What has long been acknowledged and valorized in the United States—namely, that higher-education institutions are strong organizational actors in their own right—is increasingly evident in Germany as differentiation proceeds and universities develop more specific profiles.

traditional German dual vocational education and training (VET) system (at the upper-secondary level), a balance among the various interests of the involved stakeholders—capital, labor, and the state—is feasible due to the tradition of practiced corporatism. In contrast, in the field of higher education, we encounter a largely unexplored terrain of negotiations and, crucially, decentralized cooperation (Culpepper 2003) around work-based training programs developed by higher-education institutions and firms—more or less collaboratively.

However, research on the political economy of skills thus far has mainly focused on the study of the traditional dual-training system at the secondary level as one of the hallmarks of corporatism in German capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Thus, given recent developments, the political-economy approach to skills requires adaptation to account for more recent developments in higher education (Graf 2009; Hölscher 2012). When political economists analyze skill formation, they tend to be especially interested in the role of firms (or employer associations) and trade unions in the VET system. Yet, as the dual-study principle is upgraded to the tertiary level, employers take center stage in negotiating new governance forms of higher education. Consequently, we observe changing constellations and coalitions of actor groups within higher education. We argue that the interactions of these groups, including employers and universities and their associations, among others, provide fruitful ground for future political science analyses of skill formation and higher education.

THE POLITICAL STAKES IN UPGRADED WORKPLACE-BASED TRAINING

Dual-study programs represent shifting lines of conflict in the governance of advanced skill formation. Crucially, through the bottom-up development of such schemes, two actors have gained influence relative to the others: employers as original drivers behind dual-study programs and universities as entrepreneurial actors in their own right. In contrast, the actor that

Furthermore, current institutional innovations may well undermine traditional high-level dual-study apprenticeships at the secondary level—as these are gradually shifted to higher education. However, lower-skill apprenticeships are not being similarly upgraded; therefore, dual-study programs are unlikely to close the gap between high- and low-skill sectors but rather are more likely to academize the medium sector of traditional apprenticeships (e.g., in industry and commerce occupations). The losers might be those who would have previously gained access to traditional medium-skill occupational training but are now potentially left behind as academization accelerates. Thus, we find the paradoxical dynamic in Germany that, initially, dual-study programs were thought of as potential equalizers but now mainly top secondary-school graduates are selected them. Nevertheless—and especially from a trade-union perspective—dual studies in principle could offer those without sufficient capital to invest in higher-education opportunities to successfully complete college. This participation would provide access to attractive career pathways. More generally, dual-study programs tackle issues stemming from limited market absorption at the nexus of vocational training and higher education. When successful, they embed employers’ knowledge about current and future skills demands into advanced skill formation.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF HYBRID PROGRAMS LINKING HIGHER EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

Work-based higher education in the form of dual studies is quickly becoming a key element in the German higher-education system. This development is more likely to be successful if these programs invest equally in the provision of high-level academic skills and hands-on practical skills. Employers increasingly demand this combination in recruiting talented young people for high-level training programs. More broadly, the combination and feedback processes between educational organizations and firms promise innovation at the nexus of education
In this context, a key lesson that can be learned from the German case is the need to build structures that allow higher-education organizations and employers to cooperate and to overcome potential conflicts between the worlds of academia and work.

In the two countries, especially with increased privatization and the growing need for private investments in education. However, what is crucial is inter-employer coordination, which can be facilitated by local and national intermediary organizations (e.g., business associations and chambers) that facilitate the joint development of such programs and prevent “free-rider” problems related to poaching. In these settings, firms understand that they have to pay (more) for the advanced skills they require, which may involve greater private costs in training programs and student salaries. It also implies investments in academic skills that transcend immediate firm-specific skills. Concurrently, the academy faces the challenge of developing tools that ensure systematically integrated work- and theory-based learning experiences. For this, university representatives must leave the “ivory tower” to see eye to eye with employers.

As a recent development, the insertion of the dual-study principle of vocational training into German higher education provides both opportunities and risks. At the intersection of higher education and vocational education, these programs imply increasing corporate influence in higher education. Simultaneously, expanding work-based higher-education programs may stimulate innovation, with this closer linkage of higher education to the economy facilitating advanced, practice-oriented skill formation while potentially spurring social mobility—within and beyond higher education. Thus, if policy makers set the right incentives for decentralized cooperation between public and private actors and discourage detrimental dynamics that threaten the collective spirit of work-based skill formation, this type of dual-study higher education may lead firms to invest more heavily in high-quality, tertiary-level education programs as well as salaries for student employees. Finally, a key principle of such a system is that employers and the state jointly cover the costs of work-based higher education. These costs would be balanced by benefits such as integrated curricula, enhanced firm competitiveness, and better skill matching.

Another strength of dual-study programs is the high degree of curricular integration between the two learning environments of the university and the firm. Yet, this ideal tends to be quite challenging to implement in practice. In Germany, the institutional conditions are favorable partly due to a long-standing tradition of collective governance in the field of work-based training through the key stakeholders, including educational organizations, employers, trade unions, and state agencies. The dual-study programs’ integration of a formal vocational-training certificate and a bachelor’s degree illustrates this crucial collaboration. In these programs, the Chambers of Commerce are involved, for example, in examining candidates for vocational-training certification. To foster the cooperation of all involved actors and enhance the necessary fine-tuning between the learning experiences in the university and the workplace, it seems worthwhile to explore how cooperative study programs in the United States could offer a double qualification: a bachelor’s degree and a registered apprenticeship certificate. An additional advantage is that if students realize that achieving a bachelor’s degree is too demanding for them, they still have the fallback option of earning a registered apprenticeship certificate. Where this reduces college-dropout rates, it would save the loss of human capital and help individuals to qualify for entry into skilled-labor markets.

Another potential advantage of apprenticeship training being offered in conjunction with higher education is that it would boost the reputation of apprenticeships overall. Experiences from countries including Germany and Switzerland show that the attractiveness of the apprenticeship-training system as a whole is bolstered when it also offers a viable pathway for those individuals with a traditional university-entrance certificate. If these students seriously consider and choose advanced work-based higher education, this well may increase the standing of practice-oriented training among students, their families, and employers. Thus, when considering strategies to improve skill formation overall, reducing the costs that individuals must bear in attaining higher education, and improving the fit between educational expectations of employers and potential employees, dual-study programs provide an innovative model for policy making on both sides of the Atlantic.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Higher education around the globe has undergone dramatic transformations over the past few decades, as mass higher education has become a near-universal policy across the industrialized world. However, not all new graduates have entered high-paying, secure jobs. Higher education only produces a “high skill society” where labor market institutions permit entry by new graduates and offer them wages and employment that match their skills. In this article, we argue that because labor market institutions vary dramatically, in some countries, particularly in southern Europe, many new graduates are likely to be under-employed and under-paid, potentially producing a widespread growth of political dissatisfaction among these new *indignados*.

The contributions to this symposium on the comparative politics of higher education emphasize that higher education systems vary dramatically in their reliance on private funds, in their stratification or universalism, and in the ways they accordingly shape and reshape class and race relations in society. And yet, among policymakers, even if the governance and funding structure of higher education remain bones of contention, there is emphatic agreement that mass higher education provision is a desirable policy. This ambition was paramount in the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy of 2000 which aimed at Europe becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.” Though declarations of intent from the European Union may not be history’s most reliable guide to ensuing policy making, in this case member governments did appear to be at one with strategies of expanding enrollment, and often funding, for university systems across Europe. This “massification” of higher education (Trow 1973) has also been apparent over the past several decades in North America, Australia and New Zealand, East Asia—first Japan, then South Korea and Taiwan, and now China—and more generally among upper middle income countries.

What happens to all of these new graduates once they enter the labor market? The study of “life transitions” has typically been the domain of education sociologists who have provided important data on cross-national trends for graduates (Breen and Jonsson 2005; Shavit, Arum, and Gamoran 2007). However, many of these works neglect the labor market institutions that govern how employers and the state demand, use, and remunerate skilled workers. Moreover, existing work has not asked how the relative labor market success of skilled workers shapes their attitudes about the economy and politics, even as graduates have verged on a majority of the workforce across the industrialized world.

Fortunately, existing literatures in comparative political economy provide a framework within which to think about and empirically examine the socioeconomic outcomes and preferences of university graduates. Scholars have long emphasized the important role that labor market institutions governing wage bargaining and employment rights have in shaping the distribution of wages (Wallerstein 1999). In addition, countries with large public sectors also tend to have more compressed wage distributions (Iversen and Wren 1998). Broadly then, long-standing institutional differences across countries create stable cross-national patterns of wage compression. These differences shape the relative prospects of graduates (Ansell and Gingrich 2013), reducing both the downside risk of low wages to graduates but also upside benefits of high wages.

Wage compression is not the only institutional difference facing graduates. Because graduates traditionally entered the professions, restrictions on entry into these professions or impediments to their expansion will also condition how new graduates fare. Existing work in comparative political economy has long noted that restricted entry into jobs in manufacturing has created labor market dualization (Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Rueda 2007). However, there has been less attention paid to barriers to entry in high skilled professions (though see Häusermann, Kurer and Schwander 2015) on ‘high skilled outsiders’. In many continental European countries, access to high-paying professions such as public notary is highly restricted and these professions have effectively protected themselves from market entry by rival firms or industries. In such countries, when university enrollment is low, those few graduates in the labor market dominate these professions and receive high wage returns. However, once higher education enrollment expands, professional sectors are unable to absorb these graduates and resist downward pressure on their wages and privileges. This may push graduates into typically “non-graduate” jobs.

These institutional differences—wage compression and professional “protectionism”—mean that the universal story of rising higher education enrollment will have strikingly different labor market outcomes across the developed world. In some countries, the graduate wage premium will continue to rise even as a majority of citizens attend college. According to data we...
analyzed from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the gross monthly wage premium for graduates rose by 10% between 1993 and 2012 in the UK, Ireland, Holland and a number of other European countries. In others, graduation rates rose but the graduate wage premium has remained stable or declined, as is the case in France, Portugal, across Europe and is broadly associated with lower wages compared to non-mismatched individuals. Figure 1 shows the country average proportion of degree-holders who are either in mismatched jobs or self-or unemployed (which we view as other forms of mismatch, though the patterns look similar if we exclude these groups), plotted by the proportion of the workforce who hold a degree for the period 1993 to 2012. Where graduation rates remain very low, as in Portugal, mismatch is unsurprisingly also low. However, beyond Portugal there is a clear negative correlation—in many countries such as Italy, Austria, and Greece, new graduates are often failing to enter graduate level employment, either by entering non-graduate jobs or ending up self-employed or unemployed.

Mismatch also appears common in countries with long-standing traditions in vocational training such as Switzerland and Germany (Busemeyer 2014). In these examples what might appear to be mismatch could be less problematic—graduates entering fields with a lower presence of graduates but with traditionally high skill levels because of vocational training. The southern European cases are more problematic because such systems are absent so when graduates enter non-graduate employment it is typically low-skill work. By contrast in the Scandinavian countries, even though graduation rates are high, the majority of graduates do work in graduate positions. Any claims about causality must be cautious—Scandinavia may have expanded higher education early because its labor market institutions could absorb higher-skilled workers more effectively. Still, the “shock” of policy diffusion of higher education expansion to countries with

These institutional differences—wage compression and professional “protectionism”—mean that the universal story of rising higher education enrollment will have strikingly different labor market outcomes across the developed world.

Spain, and Sweden. In the case of the Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, this is not because graduates cannot find “graduate-level” jobs but because wage compression prevents soar-away salaries for the best-paid graduates. However, in the case of other countries—typically in southern Europe—where professions remain protected but higher education expands, the problem of “skill mismatch” may be increasingly common.

“Mismatch” occurs when graduates enter jobs that have not been traditionally associated with holding a university degree. Of course in a few cases, for example agriculture, new graduates may actually improve productivity in the job. However, in many cases, mismatch happens when graduates enter low-skill employment that neither uses their skill-set nor pays them a graduate premium—a classic example would be university graduates working in retail jobs. In these cases, for example Italy and Spain, a generation of under-employed, or at least under-remunerated, young graduates may emerge. Social investment policies of mass higher education are not creating “competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economies” to requote the Lisbon Agenda. They are creating the conditions for mass discontent—for indignados and populism—often at odds with the European project.

While space prevents us from a more detailed analysis of how mismatch plays out economically and in terms of political preferences, we present a couple of graphs that show the extent of the problem across Europe. Here we draw on data from the ECHP and the EU-SILC datasets mentioned above. We are able to sort working-age citizens across Europe into “jobs”—defined as an occupation-sector combination. This follows the technique used in Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) to measure changes in job “quality” by occupation-sector combination. Doing so permits us to move beyond accounts that identify solely occupation (Rehm 2011) or sector (Walter 2010) to be able to distinguish among different types of workers within sectors, and among similar workers across sectors. We then define a mismatched individual as someone who is in a job where fewer than 60% of workers have a degree (defined across all Europe as a whole). Obviously this threshold is somewhat arbitrary and misses variation within occupation-sector combinations. But as our figures show, the mismatch variable defined this way does vary dramatically...
Of course the benefits to higher education should not solely be judged by the labor market. Perhaps a vigorous democracy depends on an educated citizenry and the international cultural and educational relations inspired by higher education. However, if mismatched graduates themselves lose trust in the political system and the wider European project, even more diffuse benefits may be under threat.

**NOTE**

1. The ECHP and SILC data is used on behalf of contract reference 49/2013-EU-SILC between Jane Gingrich and Eurostat. The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data lies entirely with the authors.

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As the various contributions to this symposium impressively demonstrate, there are strong interconnections between education and other types of social policy. In the context of the ongoing structural transformation towards the service-oriented knowledge economy, education is widely believed to play a crucial role in mitigating social and economic inequality. However, as I will argue in this short essay, the linkages between education and the welfare state are much more complex than often assumed. More specifically, Busemeyer (2015) identifies three linkages between education and the welfare state regime more broadly defined: first, in terms of politics, there has been a significant overlap in the politico-economic coalitions promoting institutional and policy change in education as well as other social policies (Iversen and Stephens 2008; see also the contributions by Eaton and Garritzmann in this symposium). Second, the institutional design of education and training systems has implications for social inequality (see the contributions by Graf and Powell as well as Eaton); that is, as other social policies, it affects the outcomes of policy making. Third, education and welfare state institutions shape popular expectations and attitudes towards policy-making. These feedback effects contribute to stabilizing development paths of education and welfare state regimes in the long run (see also the contributions by Garritzmann and Rose in this symposium).

In the following, I am going to focus on the second aspect—the potential of education to mitigate social inequality. In a seminal contribution to the comparative welfare state literature, Wilensky (1975) expressed some doubts with regard to the effectiveness of education to reduce inequality. And indeed, the connection between education and inequality is much less straightforward than could be expected. For instance, public debates about educational reforms often center on the issue of expanding access to higher education because this is argued to be crucial in today’s service-oriented knowledge economies (Wren 2013). While this may be true to a large extent, the expansion of access to higher education is not necessarily a panacea with regard to lowering inequality, because the redistributive implications of investment in higher education are complex (Ansell 2010; see also Garritzmann in this symposium). This is because investing in education creates both private as well as public benefits, the former in the form of higher wages for educated individuals, the latter by boosting the economic growth potential of the economy. When private benefits are particularly high (e.g. when additional educational investments in higher education boost the wages of the well-educated), the effectiveness of education to mitigate inequality is reduced.

Hence, in assessing the potential contribution for higher education to lowering social inequality, it is important to take into account how exactly private and public benefits are balanced out. To a large extent, this is a function of the division of labor between public and private sources of financing in higher education. In countries with a high share of private sources of education funding (the bulk of which are tuition fees), levels of socio-economic inequality are significantly higher, whereas the opposite can be observed in countries with predominantly public sources of funding (Busemeyer 2015, 194, 200). Obviously, correlation does not necessarily imply causation, but it is plausible to assume that high levels of private financing can turn into an effective access barrier to higher education for students with a low-income background. While the United States had been a pioneer with regard to opening up access to higher education in the postwar decades, the excessive growth of tuition fees in recent years accompanied by a commensurate increase in student debt has significantly diminished the potential of higher education to contribute to mitigating inequality (see the contributions by Eaton and Rose). This is different in countries in which universities are predominantly financed with public monies and where generous student subsidy regimes promote high levels of enrolment for students from low-income backgrounds, as in the Scandinavian cases (see Garritzmann).

In addition to the direct effects of financing arrangements on access to higher education, the division of labor between public and private sources of funding can also feed back on public perceptions and expectations towards the welfare state (Busemeyer 2015, chapter 5). Individuals who have incurred significant human capital investments out of their own pockets and who may be burdened with high levels of student-related debt are more likely to accept (or even demand) a deregulated labor market regime, which awards educational investments with significantly higher wages, contributing to higher levels of wage inequality. As is also shown in Busemeyer (2013), citizens from countries with a higher private share in education spending are less likely to support government-induced redistribution. Thus, a high private spending share
lowers overall support for a generous welfare state, mitigating the potential for social policy to depress inequality.

Besides concerns related to the financing of (higher) education, a second issue of importance for the potential of education to contribute to lowering inequality is the balance between vocational education and training (VET) and academic (higher) education. As indicated above, education systems with a strong VET component are often regarded critically, because they are not well positioned to meet the needs of the service-oriented knowledge economy (Wren 2013) or because they contribute to higher levels of educational inequality by diverting youths from low-income backgrounds from pursuing higher education studies (see the contribution by Graf and Powell). Even though these claims are not unfounded, it is important to recognize that well-established VET systems can also have positive effects with regard to the labor market integration of youths with more “practical” talents. As has been argued in the literature on Varieties of Capitalism (Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001), the existence of well-developed VET systems in coordinated market economies boosts the relative labor market position of youths in the lower half of the skills distribution by opening up access routes to high-quality training, ideally in a workplace setting as in apprenticeship or dual study programs. This in turn facilitates smooth transitions from education to the world of work with lower levels of youth unemployment. These are the reasons why, in many countries, apprenticeship training has become an attractive reform model again in the wake of the recent economic and financial crisis.

In sum, this short comment was meant to convey one core message: there are important linkages and complementarities between education and the welfare state regime at large, but these linkages are complex. The potential for education to contribute to lowering social inequality critically depends on two factors: the division of labor between public and private sources of education funding and the balance between academic higher education and VET. In the ongoing transformation towards the service-based knowledge economy, VET often receives less attention than it deserves. Furthermore, the continuing expansion of academic higher education needs to be accompanied by debates about its financing: public funding and subsidies are important in order to enable students from weaker social backgrounds to partake in the rise of the knowledge economy.

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Community Colleges, Shared Governance, and Democracy

Matthew Reed, Brookdale Community College

Shared governance is a hotly contested topic throughout higher education in the United States, but the tensions surrounding it are in particularly stark relief in the community college sector. As a practicing community college administrator, I will suggest here that the tensions around shared governance and performance funding offer a rare opportunity for fruitful research.

Community colleges occupy a unique niche in American higher education. They were born in the twentieth century—Joliet Junior College in Illinois is generally recognized as the first, established in 1901—and quickly came to embody multiple missions that often stand in tension with each other (Cohen and Brawer 2008). At the time of writing, they enroll approximately 45% of undergraduate students in the United States (AACC 2016), yet they tend to remain an afterthought in most policy discussions on higher education.

As with public education generally, community colleges differ in their governance structures from one state to another. California has “districts” with “superintendents,” very much like K-12 public schools. In Pennsylvania, community colleges draw funding from the budgets of public high schools within their service areas. In New Jersey, their “districts” are counties, and the county Boards of Chosen Freeholders (the county legislatures) set appropriations for their operating budgets. In Massachusetts, community colleges have neither districts nor county support; they compete for enrollment very much as independent colleges do. In Michigan, community colleges rely on “millages,” or property taxes set by referenda.

Some states, such as Minnesota and Tennessee, have statewide Boards of Regents to which each campus president reports. In others, the presidents are selected locally and report to local boards. Some boards are elected, as in Arizona, some are appointed by a governor or a county legislature, and some are appointed by multiple authorities, with each authority controlling different numbers of seats on the board.

With such different governance structures and reporting lines, it should be unsurprising that the political imperatives faced by colleges vary widely. Still, performance funding has arisen as a common issue over the last decade that provides potentially fruitful ground for scholarly inquiry. Many states have conditioned some or all of their appropriations for operating budgets on various “performance” measures. The measures generally include graduation rates taken from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), as well as milestones towards completion and—sometimes—preferences for certain majors or populations. In Ohio, the entire operating appropriation for a given community college is based on performance funding (NCSL 2016).

Community colleges tend to push back on the IPEDS graduation rate, because the headline rate of this most commonly used performance statistic counts only first-time, full-time, degree-seeking students. Yet, on most campuses, the IPEDS cohort is a distinct minority. Even within that minority, a student who transfers after a year to a four-year college and subsequently graduates with a bachelor’s degree shows up in the community college statistics as a dropout.

Such measurement errors have political consequences: legislators who don’t know any better may see a 20% graduation rate as a travesty, rather than a sign that they’re counting the wrong way. The IPEDS measure is based on the assumption that students are 18-years-old, full-time, and living on campus; when applied to a much more heterogeneous student body, most of whom work thirty hours a week or more for pay, it leads to distorted readings. For example, a student who takes twice the “normative” time to degree counts as a dropout. When a college has a majority of part-time students, as many community colleges do, that wreaks havoc on the headline number.

This funding regime also tends to sit uneasily with shared governance, and it is in looking closely at tensions between performance funding and shared governance that political scientists have an important contribution to make. Shared governance is often understood to refer to collaboration among the constituencies within a given institution, with each having its special role. For example, it is generally assumed that faculty members collectively have primary responsibility for the academic program of the college, including but not limited to academic standards, what shall be taught, and in what format. The administration is generally assumed to be responsible for the budget and all that goes with it (AAUP 2016).

This is not a perfect model—anyone who thinks that curriculum and budget are easily separable is invited to attend a discussion of cost-cutting and program prioritization—but it is generally accepted. It is part of the expectations of regional accrediting bodies, and it sometimes is a condition for state licensure. Border skirmishes among the various constituencies are frequent, but they do not bring the model into question.

The underlying assumption of shared governance is that everyone agrees about who is sharing. In the context of public institutions, the state (and/or local funding entity) is assumed to be a silent partner. But performance funding has recast the nature of shared governance, with states (and/or local funding entities) demanding much greater voice in the academic...
decision-making of community colleges, even at the level of curriculum. The new assertiveness of funders can look to campus constituencies like an attack on shared governance, because it constrains the choices available. It can also be interpreted as an expansion of shared governance to include the entire polity, with the elected legislative branch representing the populace’s concerns.

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Public higher education has long struggled with the need to serve two masters: the public at large, and the community of educated professionals who determine credentials. At a basic level, it is a tension between expertise and democracy. “Shared governance” as an ideal attempts to split the difference between expertise and democracy. It does so by implicitly allocating spheres of influence according to presumed expertise: faculty control over the curriculum, the administration’s control over the budget, and so on. Expanding shared governance to include the public at large, via legislatures, resolves the conflict between expertise and democracy, in favor of democracy. That can prevent undue insularity, but it can also lead to decisions made on the basis of demagoguery, rather than knowledge.

At stake in the battles over shared governance is the purpose of the community-college sector. Are campuses simply arms of the state, to be deployed to serve broad policy goals? If so, on what basis can we assume that academic freedom will be upheld? (To put it another way, to the extent that colleges are subject to majoritarian control, what is to stop a legislature from punishing faculty who teach unpopular material?) Or are colleges freestanding, if subsidized, institutions subject to the control of local faculty and administration? In a low-trust external context, the latter can be a hard sell, but the former tends to lead to tremendous internal conflict. Does the move to performance funding represent usurpation, or a (possibly unintentional) move towards greater democracy?

The “greater democracy” reading is challenged by the increasing influence of a few large private foundations. In a context of sustained austerity, a few large private funders have found fertile ground to wield influence. Gates, Lumina, and their various offshoots have largely set the national agenda—what they call the “completion agenda”—and organized political pressure around it (Ruark 2013). Private foundations are tax-exempt, but unelected and politically unaccountable. As states have disinvested and budget shortfalls have become chronic, a few people with money wield considerable power.

More often than not, performance funding has been perceived to be punitive. For institutions with high fixed costs—typically, labor is the lion’s share of a college’s operating budget—variable funding creates crises of its own. Illinois and Arizona have recently cut state funding for certain community colleges to zero, effectively abdicating the state partnership role, though they have maintained legal control. With campuses increasingly expected to be both economically self-sufficient and accountable to external legislative authorities, tensions are inevitable. Those tensions tend to peak during recessions, when state revenues decline at the same time that community college enrollments increase.

Budgetary pressures are unlikely to go away, as community colleges compete with programs like Medicaid and K-12 education for funding from tax revenues, and policy makers frequently seek to use tax cuts to stimulate the economy. At this stage, political responses appear contradictory. At the state level, where balanced budgets are almost always a legal requirement, operating cuts (or failures to keep up with costs) are the order of the day. At the federal level, where deficit spending is an option, a movement for “free community college” has gained traction. Assuming sufficient political momentum—which is far from given—it is unclear how a federal push for free community college would operate through the diverse and multi-level funding systems across the country. Nationally, federal support accounts for about 14% of community college revenues, so a national push for free community college would mean a dramatic shift in funding sources and, presumably, reporting lines.

After a history of being largely overlooked in higher education, community colleges have received both new attention and, inevitably, new scrutiny. But the contradictory demands being placed upon them have not been fully theorized. By researching the tensions reviewed here, political scientists could contribute to better policy making in the community-college sector.

NOTE

1. For the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, see the website of the National Center for Education Statistics at https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/.

REFERENCES


Bargaining for Good Jobs and Debt-Free College

Kathryn Lybarger, President, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Local 3299

In July 2015, the University of California (UC) President Janet Napolitano announced that the university would raise its minimum wage to $15 an hour for all employees and subcontractors working at least 20 hours per week. UC’s “Fair Wage/Fair Work” plan is the first $15 hourly wage standard at a public university in the United States, and the national Fight for $15 minimum wage campaign has lauded this victory as an historic step forward for workers.

The more immediate backdrop for Napolitano’s “Fair Wage/Fair Work” policy, however, was a campaign by my union at the UC Berkeley flagship campus to insource nearly 100 low-wage subcontracted workers. Known as AFSCME 3299, our union—UC’s largest—had launched a “speakers boycott.” The boycott called for all invited speakers—including former US President Clinton—to refuse to give speeches on campus at a public university directly hired the custodians and parking attendants who had been outsourced. These workers performed the same labor as UC employees but for far less pay and minimal or no benefits from their subcontractor-employers. With the help of student and faculty solidarity, our union eventually won the campaign to bring UC Berkeley’s subcontracted workers in-house. The victory provides a path out of poverty for these workers by securing benefits, job security, and wages above the new UC $15 minimum wage.

At the same time, however, President Napolitano has used her new $15 minimum wage policy to blunt our union’s broader insourcing campaign for other subcontracted workers at UC. Claiming that the $15 minimum is sufficient, the university has lobbied against legislation backed by Local 3299 that would set the same “prevailing wage” standard for subcontracting that is used for all other California state employees. In short, the UC’s “historic” new $15 minimum wage is being used as a lever to support the university’s efforts to lower its labor costs by outsourcing evermore work to subcontractors with precarious job security and much lower wages and benefits than in-house UC employees. This, of course, is all happening at a time of truly historic income inequality in California.

Sadly, UC has often justified cost-cutting on the backs of low-wage workers as necessary for expanding affordability and supporting low-income students. As a mother of two aspiring UC students, I know as well as anyone that we need to make UC affordable again. But eliminating my job security and reducing my modest pay as a UC groundskeeper is like robbing Peter to pay Paul. Without a decent job, UC employees like me will struggle even more to help our children do well enough in school to gain admissions to UC—let alone graduate from college and pay off student loans. And given that UC is one of California’s largest employers, cuts to job security and compensation lower the bar for workers well beyond the university.

The silver lining to all this is that state funding cuts have brought students and labor unions into common cause by leading to both rising student debt from tuition and labor cost-cutting. As noted in Charlie Eaton’s “Still Public” contribution to this symposium, our union has sought to build a broader and stronger coalition from this natural alliance by supporting the use of increased state funding to freeze tuition since 2011. Many more higher education unions, including affiliates of the Service Employees International Union and the American Federation of Teachers, have begun to take a similar approach through the Bargaining for the Common Good strategy promoted by the Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor at Georgetown University. Through Bargaining for the Common Good, our unions are exploring how to make demands in collective bargaining for policies like tuition relief that can advance our goals as public servants even if they do not relate directly to labor relations (Lerner and Bhatti 2016; McCartin 2016).

Still, Eaton makes the on-the-mark assessment in “Still Public” that alliances with university leaders are also necessary to move toward durable reforms on student debt and funding for higher education. Our union would welcome a discussion with UC executives and university leaders more broadly about how we could work together to support expanded public funding for higher education. I think that labor and administrators will need to think big and break out of the boxes from which we have related to each other. If university administrators want to work with student debt coalition partners, they will need to move beyond the largely oppositional relationship to their employees’ unions (and often students) that they have long maintained. Moreover, big ideas like debt-free college that have captured the public imagination in 2016 are not necessarily antithetical to either university employees’ desire for good jobs or administrators’ interest in improving financial stability and educational quality.

As we come together, we may experience that the best policies do not always make the best politics, as Tobias Schulze-Cleven and Julian Garritzmann ably show in this symposium. But as partners with students in the fight for debt-free college, both university labor and management could contribute...
to the adoption of reforms that would provide the resources needed for universities to be great employers and outstanding educational institutions. So let’s talk!

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NOTE
1. See also http://www.bargainingforthecommongood.org/.

REFERENCES